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Abstract
Scalable and Efficient Network Anomaly Detection on Connection Data Streams
Aniss Chohra
Everyday, security experts and analysts must deal with and face the huge increase of cyber security
threats that are propagating very fast on the Internet and threatening the security of hundreds of millions of
users worldwide. The detection of such threats and attacks is of paramount importance to these experts in
order to prevent these threats and mitigate their effects in the future. Thus, the need for security solutions
that can prevent, detect, and mitigate such threats is imminent and must be addressed with scalable and
efficient solutions. To this end, we propose a scalable framework, called Daedalus, to analyze streams of
NIDS (network-based intrusion detection system) logs in near real-time and to extract useful threat secu-
rity intelligence. The proposed system pre-processes massive amounts of connections stream logs received
from different participating organizations and applies an elaborated anomaly detection technique in order
to distinguish between normal and abnormal or anomalous network behaviors. As such, Daedalus detects
network traffic anomalies by extracting a set of significant pre-defined features from the connection logs and
then applying a time series-based technique in order to detect abnormal behavior in near real-time. More-
over, we correlate IP blocks extracted from the logs with some external security signature-based feeds that
detect factual malicious activities (e.g., malware families and hashes, ransomware distribution, and com-
mand and control centers) in order to validate the proposed approach. Performed experiments demonstrate
that Daedalus accurately identifies the malicious activities with an average F1 score of 92.88%. We fur-
ther compare our proposed approach with existing K-Means and deep learning (LSTMs) approaches and
demonstrate the accuracy and efficiency of our system.
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In this chapter, we present the motivations of our work. Then, we formally define the problem that we
try to solve, state our objectives and research contributions. Finally, we give an overview of this thesis
organization.
1.1 Motivations
During the last decade, a huge increase in the number of cyber threats and security attacks has been observed
ranging from ransomware attacks to denial of service attacks and botnets, and from social engineering threats
to data breach threats, which poses a real threat to millions of users, making the prevention, mitigation, and
detection of such attacks a challenging and difficult task for security analysts and experts. As an example
to such threats, The Wannacry Ransomware [74] released by a hacking group named Shadow Brokers,
propagated worldwide during May 2017, and had devastating consequences in several countries affecting
hundreds of thousands of machines and many organizations, such as Cambrian College in Canada and Saudi
Telecom company. Another example is The Mirai Botnet [15] which also had a severe impact worldwide
in late 2016 mostly in the U.S by affecting vulnerable Internet of Things devices and turning them into a
zombie army.
In order to detect these threats in fast and quick time delays, security analysts have a wide range of
tools and frameworks such as: social networks where users react to worldwide attacks and vulnerabilities
in real-time, intrusion detection and prevention tools that monitor (log) network traffic activities in human
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readable formats, and many others. Although intrusion detection systems offer network activity monitoring
in real-time, they suffer from some limitations such as the tremendous lag to learn novel attcks signatures
and add them to the dedicated databases. In addition to that, these databases tend to grow exponentially in
size thus leading to decrease their access time. Therefore, the need of security experts for techniques and
approaches to take advantage of these logged data, and generate useful cyber threat intelligence has arisen.
These techniques must not only be able to detect known attack patterns or signatures, but also detect zero-
day attacks, all of this in a scalable and less resources consumption fashion. As an example of proposed
techniques, anomaly detection is a field of interest that has attracted many researchers due to its ability to
solve some of the issues mentioned above.
1.2 Problem Statement
Nowadays, many attacks and threats are launched around the globe to such an extent that detecting and
monitoring all of them is not an easy and straightforward task. Moreover, the time interval between the oc-
curence of these threats and their detection by cyber experts and analysts can be very critical to the security
of cyber infrastructures. Security analysts need to be aware of what is happening on their organization’s
network in near real-time fashion. Thus, they need tools that enable them to monitor all the network traffic
and activity that is occuring in a quickly time delays. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are the most used
tools to achieve the aforementioned goal by logging all targeted network traffic by security experts in a hu-
man readable and comprehensive manner. However, these IDS tools are not enough to detect all the attacks
within the network since they do not come with the fully detection functionalities especially for unknown
attacks signatures. Therefore, security analysts and experts needed to develop and come-up with new tech-
niques in order for them to leverage these logged activities and increase the detection rate of such attacks.
Anomaly detection is one of the most explored and studied fields in order to achieve the aforementioned ob-
jective. Many approaches and algorithms have been proposed for anomaly detection task falling into many
paradigms (machine learning, statistical, soft-computing, etc), and each one of them has its advantages over
other techniques and its limitations and flaws. But, the majority of these anomaly detection techniques suffer
from scalability issues due to the fact that they deal in most cases with small datasets (Benchmark datasets),
and it is very rare to find one of these techniques experimenting with huge network traffic. To address these
2
challenges, we designed and developed a framework called Daedalus capable of generating cyber threat
intelligence from a stream of connections by detecting anomalies in a scalable way, geolocate threat actors,
and correlate this intelligence with external and factual security sources. Daedalus uses a combination of
several algorithms and is splitted into four major steps: feature extraction where we select the appropriate
set of features needed and apply the required preprocessing on them to get the observed network behavior,
adaptive thresholding where we define a dynamic and adaptive threshold for each of these extracted features,
predictive analysis where we propose our own predictive algorithms, which tries to remove noisy patterns
from the observed network behavior, and anomaly detection step where we compute anomalies scores and
make a decision based on them in order to decide whether a feature is anomalous or not. Our tool aims to
fix this scalability issue by leveraging the advantages of some state of the art techniques and improve the
execution times, CPU, and RAM consumption.
1.3 Objectives and Contributions
The main objective of this research is to build a scalable tool and framework capable of analyzing massive
stream of connection logs from different sources, aggregate them in a smart and useful way, and detect
malicious and abnormal network activities. To this end, we aim to achieve the following complimentary
objectives:
a) Analyze massive connection streams to generate in an efficient and scalable way threat intelligence
that can be used in the detection, identification, mitigation, and attribution of cyber threats.
b) Correlate this generated intelligence with other security sources of indicators of compromise (IoCs) in
order to have more details about the detected malicious activity, such as malware family or malware
hashes.
c) Validate the proposed technique through extensive experimentation on real-life IDS streams.
By fully achieving these objectives, we would be able to help security analysts to analyze streams of connec-
tions logs in more details and take security decisions based on the generated threat intelligence; for instance,
blacklisting some malicious IP blocks.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
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a) Comparative study of the state of the art proposals in network anomaly detection on connection stream
data.
b) Design and elaboration of an innovative technique for network anomaly detection on connection
stream data that achieves high efficiency and scalability.
c) Design and implementation of a framework that analyzes massive real-life connection stream data.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 provides the necessary background and the
litterature review of the most prominent related work. Chapter 3 presents the time series based technique
used for anomaly detection. Chapter 4 gives details about the proposed system including the implementation
details (code samples), the technology stack describing all the technologies used, and the built web portals
containing the user-friendly dashboards. In addition to that, we also detail the steps to evaluate our approach.
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis with some remarks and notes and discusses possible future works.
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Chapter 2
Background and State of the Art
In this chapter, we first introduce the needed background for our work including an overview of intrusion
detection systems (IDSs), and an overview of BRO NIDS tool. Then, we state the most relevant works that
have been proposed and published in the field of network anomaly detection.
2.1 Background
In this section, first we give a general description of intrusion detection systems (IDS) and compare between
two main types of IDS; namely: host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) and network-based intrusion
intrusion detection systems (NIDS). Next, we are going to have a detailed view of Bro NIDS in which we
describe its architecture and design. Then, we present a detailed state of the art of existing network anomaly
detection techniques.
2.1.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
In parallel with the continious growth of the Internet and Information Systems, novel attempts to attack these
networks and tools and exploit possible their vulnerabilities also have increased tremendously. Thus, making
the detection, mitigation, and prevention of such threats very important for every security expert. Intrusion
detection systems (IDS) are the most used tools in order to achieve the above goals. Intrusion detection
system (IDS) can be any software or device which monitors networks and devices activities in order to
detect suspicious activities. Thus, intrusion detection systems’ main goal is to prepare the background for
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any security expert to deal with possible threats by:
a) Collecting and monitoring information from different systems and networks,
b) Make them suitable for further analysis in order to detect possible security policies breaches.
Also, IDS systems provide the following functionalities:
a) Monitoring and analysing different users’ activities.
b) Security assessment of different vulnerabilities found on the network.
c) Statistical overview of network/users activities patterns and matching them to known attack patterns.
d) Detection of anomalous activities by analysing the flowing traffic over the monitored network.
But in most cases these systems are not enough to completely protect from all types of attacks; especially
when all Internet services are publicly available with in most cases their open-source codes/implementations
making it easier for attackers to:
a) evade detection techniques by mimicing in some cases normal activities behaviors like in Mimicry
Attacks,
b) or in other cases implementing novel attacks which do not have known signatures detected by these
IDS systems (zero-day attacks).
Thus, the evaluation of these IDSs’ efficiency and performance systems is of paramount importance for
security experts before completely deploying them on the targeted network infrastructure. In this context,
three metrics/criterias are used to evaluate them:
a) Accuracy which represents the IDS system ability to detect and flag attacks without the presence of
false positives (flagging of benign activities as threats).
b) Scalability is the most important of these three metrics as it represents the IDS system’s speed and
rate at auditing and monitoring network/users activities; the more the scalability metric is better, the
closest the detection functionality is to real-time.
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c) Resistance to Threats and Vulnerabilities which represents the ability of the IDS system itself to
resist to possible attacks and evasion techniques.
2.1.1.1 Host-based versus Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can be categorized into two main categories depending on the site of
their deployement in addition to other diffrences.
a) Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems are the first category of IDS that have been proposed since
the first designs of IDSs. In HIDS environments, the systems to protect are mainly computer stations; where
on each computer station an HIDS system/client is deployed that monitors the computer’s system state for
any suspicious and critical changes and these clients communicate the logs that they collected with a central
HIDS server which is generally located on the internal side of the local network to monitor (behind the
firewall); like depicted in Figure 2.1.
The main advantage of HIDS is that they allow the local detection of possible attacks/threats or intrud-
ers before their propagation to the whole network infrastructure. In addition to that, and in regard to the
deployement of distributed attacks, the need of implementing a communication prototype that allows differ-
ent workstations to exchange their HIDS information in order to detect such distributed attacks. However,
HIDS systems have a major flaw which consists of their limitation in detecting attacks on the infrastructure
network itself; especially with the widespreading of wide ranged attacks like distributed denial of service
attacks (DDoS).
b) Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems on the other hand are deployed in order to detect attacks
on the whole targeted infrastructure’s network. Thus, they are generally deployed on the side of targeted
network’s firewall/router in order to log all incoming and outgoing network traffic; like shown in 2.2.
These are generally deployed on the network’s firewall level and analyse the incoming and outgoing
network traffic in order to detect known attacks behaviors/patterns. There are many differences between














Figure 2.1: Architecture of HIDS.
Table 2.1: Comparative Table Between HIDS and NIDS
Functionality HIDS NIDS Description
Cost and Price - HIDS are more affordable and easy to deploy.
Required Training - HIDS are straightforward to understand whilst NIDS require deep knowledge.
Deployement Site Locally Network’s Firewall HIDS are deployed on the computer side whilst NIDS are deployed on the network’s tap.
Bandwidth Requirements Low High NIDS requires more bandwidth since it captures the whole network’s traffic.
Cross-platform Compatibility - NIDS are more adaptable to other platforms.
Packet Rejection - Only NIDS have the capability to reject some packets.
Central Management Both of them require central management.
Accuracy and False Alarms Rates High False Alarms Rates NIDS capture all network’s traffic without prior filtering; increasing the number of false alarms.
2.1.2 Bro Network-based Intrusion Detection System
Bro is a powerful open source UNIX-based Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) that is most used
to detect network behavioral anomalies for cybersecurity purposes. Bro is designed in a way that can resist






Figure 2.2: Architecture of NIDS.
separating its policy from its mechanisms. Bro comes as a package with several analyzers like protocol
analyzer for the majority of most known network TCP/UDP protocols. By analyzing network traffic, Bro
generates an abstraction of each activity analyzed as an event. In addition to that, Bro offers its own scripting
language that allows its own users to define event-based policies depending on their security requirements
[76].
2.1.2.1 Evolution and History
Bro NIDS was originally proposed and developed by Vern Paxson from ICSI’s Center for Internet Research
(ICIR), Berkley. The project was initiated in 1995 and is still being improved till now. Lawrence Berkley
National Laboratory (LBNL) started officially using the IDS in 1996, and version 0.2 applying the first
set of changes and required updates to the IDS was launched in 1997. Moreover, in 1998, Vern Paxson
published a paper in USENIX [66] in which he gave a detailed description of Bro’s architecture and de-
sign. On the same year, version 0.4 was released which added the functionality of handling and analyzing
HTTP protocol, scan detection, IP fragmentation, and Linux platform support. Just after that, and more
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precisely in 1999, version 0.6 was released allowing the open source IDS to handle regular expressions and
analyze users’ login sessions. Futhermore, in 2000, Vern Paxson published another paper [88] in which an
algorithm that is efficiently able to detect stepping stones which is an evasion technique used by attackers
to keep their anonymity while achieving their goals. During the same year, version 0.7a90 was released
which added important changes to the tool. The next year (2001), another version was released (v0.7a90)
which added profiling and states management capabilities. In 2002, version 0.7a175/0.8aX was released in
which attacks signatures, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) analyzer, IP version 6, and user manual
were added to the framework. The coming year (2003), version0.8a37 was released which came with com-
munication utilities, database persistence capability, and logs rotation. During the same year, anonymity
capability, active mapping, and contextual signatures were also added. In 2004, versions 0.8aX and 0.9aX
were released enabling the IDS to handle and analyse more protocols like Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and
Server Message Block (SMB), and also BroLite which contains the base configuration of Bro. Moreover, in
2005, version 1.0 was released introducing BinPAC which is a high lever language that is used to describe
network protocols parsers and generates C++ code. In addiction to that, and within the same year, Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) and Remote Procedure Call (RPC) analyzers were added to the tool alongside with 64-bit
architecture compatibility. Another DIMVA paper [26] was published during the same year which proposed
an approach that leverages the advantages of both host-based and network-based IDSs; by preserving the
advantages of network-based ones and improving its weaknesses using specific host-based traffic analysis
context. During the next year (2006), versions 1.1 and 1.2 were released adding when statement to the
scripting language, resource tuning, Broccoli which is: BRO Client Communication Library and allowed
Bro’s users to code applications and tools that are able to communicate in the same language used by the
communication protocol of Bro IDS, and Dynamic Protocol Detection (DPD) which instead of deciding
which protocol analyzer to use (based on the connection’s destination port), attributes an analyzer tree for
each logged connection. In 2007, version 1.3 was released in which Ctor expressions, GeoIP, and connec-
tions compressor were integrated to the tool. Additionally, and within the same year, Bro Clustering was
also introduced. In 2008, version 1.4 added changes and updates regarding Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP), BitTorrent, HTTP Entities, introduced NetFlow to Bro, and Autotuning capability. The
following year (2009), version 1.5 introducing BroControl which consists of a tool that makes Bro IDS
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straightforward. In 2010, the National Science Foundation (NSF) and more precisely the Office of Advanced
Cyberinfrastructure (OAC) awarded the improvement that had been done on Bro IDS. The next year (2011),
version 2.0 introduced new scripts to the scripting language of Bro, and just after that (in 2012), another
version was released (version 2.1) which introduced some updates and changes regarding IPv6 support and
the Input Framework that allowed Bro users to import external data into Bro tool. Last but not least, during
the year of 2013 File analysis was introduced within version 2.2 and connections Summary Statistics. Also,
during the same year, the National Science Foundation (NSF) and more precisely the Office of Advanced
Cyberinfrastructure (OAC) established a Bro Center of Expertise which is set to be a central point of com-
munication between diffrent Bro communities worldwide in order to leverage Bro technology and expertise
at the best. Figure 2.3 depicts this timeline evolution [76].
1995
2013
Vern Paxson Proposes the First Version of Bro NIDS.
































Version 2.1 released (IPv6 support improved).
2012
Version 2.2 released (File analysis and Summary Statistics).
Figure 2.3: Bro Evolution and History Timeline [76, 3].
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2.1.2.2 Architecture and Implementation
As shown in Figure 2.4, Bro NIDS has been designed as a set of three layers: packet capture, policy-neutral
event engine, and policy layer [76, 3]. These three layers have been defined according to several objectives,
the most prominent of them are stated below:
a) Separate mechanisms from policies: this objective aims to add flexibility and simplicity to the tool
by completely separating the mechanisms required to monitor a particular security policy from its
specifications.
b) Scalable monitoring: due to the huge increase of network bandwidths nowadays, NIDSs need to be
able to monitor this huge amount of network traffic in the most efficient way without missing any
potential threat.
c) Attacks resistance: one of the ways for attackers to achieve their goals successfully is to first disable
the NIDS before targeting their victims and therefore securing this NIDS is of paramount importance.
2.1.2.3 Packet Capture
In this layer, a stream of packets are extracted from the network stream and passed to the event engine layer.
In order to do so, Bro uses libpcap library which offers support for most network technologies and protocols.
Libpcap works by using efficient and powerful expression filtering in order to reduce the amount of packets
to analyze. As an example of this, if one wants to not capture SMB related network traffic (port 445); libpcap
can be configured to ignore all related traffic to port number 445. Using this concept, Bro enables security
experts to dynamically filter network traffic during run-time according to their policy requirements.
2.1.2.4 Policy-neutral Event Engine
This layer represents the core of Bro NIDS and its job is to analyze all network packets received from the
packet capture layer. By getting these raw packets, it sorts them chronoligically, and decodes application
layer protocols. This layer generates at the end of this process events based on the policy layer requirements
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and has to be very scalable and attack resistant. The event engine layer consists of several types of analyzers
where each of them is designed for a well-defined task (decoding a network protocol, signature-matching,
etc...). The event engine layer is devided into four major components:
• State Management: in Bro NIDS, each packet belongs to one single connection. Bro defines its own
connection state expiration mechanism, this is due to the fact that on large network volumes there
exists a lot of crud connections; network packets that show connections have been ended from both
ends (FIN packet) but do not conform to any pre-defined standard. One common explanation for this
type of packets are link-level errors and network protocols implementations persistant bugs.
• Transport Layer Analyzers: Bro TCP analyzer keeps track of the various state changes in each
connection, keeps track of acknowledgements sent, handles retransmissions and does much more.
This results in a real byte stream of payload data and fixes some drawbacks related to Snort IDS.
• Application Layer Analyzers: Bro also analyzes diffrent application layer protocols such as: HTTP,
SMTP, or DNS.
• Infrastructure: includes components like event and time management, Bro scripting language inter-
preter, and other data structures.
2.1.2.5 Policy Layer
This is where security experts/analysts define their environment specific network security policies. This is
achieved by writing handlers for each event raised by the event engine layer and which defines the con-
straints/alerts to generate for each relevant event. These event handlers are coded using Bro’s own scripting
language which has been designed according to network intrusion detection paradigm, proving a set of pre-
defined functionalities, like: dynamic memory management, dynamic typing, regular expressions. During
Bro startup, all the scripts enabled by default by the user are loaded and thus only the needed analyzers are
loaded leading to less resource consumption. Last but not least, Bro comes with some pre-defined policy
scripts that perform a wide range of tasks, but security experts can extend it with their own policy scripts







































Figure 2.4: Bro NIDS Architecture [76].
2.1.2.6 Log Files
After analyzing this stream of network packets and applying the required analyzers and policy scripts, Bro
generates diffrent types of log files depending on the analyzer triggered and the network protocols detected,
as shown in Figure 2.5. Consequently, Bro NIDS log files are categorized into six categories [76, 1] that are
presented below:
2.1.2.7 Network Protocols
This category gathers all the Bro log files that are related to the most common network protocols. Each
time a protocol which analyzer is enabled at startup is detected during the analysis step, Bro generates
automatically a log file for that specific protcol and stores inside it all the information that it deems necessary
to be logged. The most important log files found in this category are: a) conn log: which contains all the
information about any Internet connection that Bro considered as essential including IP addresses and ports,
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coonection state and history, number of bytes and packets sent between both ends (originator and responder
IPs). b) http log: which is generated automatically if Bro finds any connection that is requiring the usage
of HTTP protocol (even HTTPS is considered by Bro as an HTTP event), and contains in addition to conn
log file features, more information that Bro extracts from the packet like: user-agent, HTTP response codes,
HTTP request type, and so on. c) dns log: generated automatically if Bro finds any connection using DNS
protocol and besides the features of the connection, it additionally contains information about the DNS
query, DNS response, and so on.
2.1.2.8 Files
This category gathers all the Bro log files that are related to files transmitted over the network wire and
detected in the packets payloads. This information varies from files names to files sizes and from MIME
types to files overflow bytes. In addition to that, Bro offers the capability of generating MD5 and Sha1
hashes for these files; this can be useful as some malicious files can be checked using their respective hashes
against benchmark online malware databases.
2.1.2.9 NetControl
This category is related to a Bro plugin-based framework that enables network traffic control to Bro’s sen-
sors, and everything is allowed by default.
2.1.2.10 Detection
This category contains all the Bro logs files generated after a detection of an anomaly from an external
source matching (intel log and signature log), or if some error is detected on the network traffic like SSL
certificate errors for example (notice log).
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2.1.2.11 Network Observations
This category contain Bro log files that vary from SSL certificates (known_certs log) to hosts that have
completed TCP handshakes (known_hosts log), and from knwon services (known_services log) to software
information being used on the network (software log).
2.1.2.12 Other Log Files
This category is related to detected failures in the Dynamic Protocol Detection (DPD) (dpd log), but also to
unexpected network traffic activity detected by Bro (weird log).
Finally, we explore in more details the features of interest within Bro connection log (conn log) [76, 1];
since our proposed work/approach uses this log file as input. Figure 2.6 shows these features of interest.
In Bro NIDS, the word Originator refers to the host that requested a connection initiation or initiated the
Internet connection, whereas, the word Responder refers to the network host that this originator wants to
communicate with. each of these two ends have four features of interest to our work alongside with other
features that will not be discussed here. a) originator IP: represents the IP address of the host that is
initiating the Internet connection, b) originator port: represents the TCP/UPD port of the network service
that the originator requested, responder IP: represents the IP address of the responding host, responder
port: represents the TCP/UDP port that this host used to reply to the originator’s request, originator bytes:
represents the total amount of bytes sent by the originator on the wire, responder bytes: represents the total
amount of bytes sent in the responder’s reply, originator packets: represents the number of packets sent by
the originator to the responder on the wire, and responder packets: represents the number of packets sent in
the responder’s reply.
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Figure 2.5: Bro NIDS Generated Log Files Taxonomy [76, 1].
2.2 Anomaly Detection Existing Approaches
According to our litterature review on network anomaly field, and more precisely to these two surveys
[10, 45], network anomaly detection proposed techniques can be splitted into three categories: machine
learning techniques, statistical techniques, and soft-computing techniques (Figure . 2.7). Machine learning
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Figure 2.6: Bro NIDS Generated Connection Log Files Features [76, 1].
techniques are splitted into two main categories: supervised or unsupervised techniques. Statistical tech-
niques which mainly depend on time-series analysis in order to detect abnormal activites (peaks) according
to a pre-computed threshold, and soft-computing techniques which are better when it comes to deal with an
environment with uncertainties and unprecisions.
2.2.1 Machine Learning Anomaly Detection
Machine learning based techniques use a set of common and most-known machine learning approaches
and methodologies in order to detect abnormal activity on networks’ traffics. As shown in Figure 2.8,
this category of network anomaly detection approaches is devided into two sub-categories: a) supervised
techniques which require generally a training phase in which a model is trained and built from a training
data, and a testing phase which allows to test the accuracy of the generated model against testing data. The
data used for these models is generally labelled and the goal of the built and validated model is to predict
future unlabelled data targeting a certain class of labels. b) Unsupervised techniques on the other hand do
not require to train a model and use generally unlabelled datasets, one of the most common machine learning
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Figure 2.7: General Overview of Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
Machine Learning Anomaly Detection
Unsupervised
Supervised
Figure 2.8: Classification of Machine Learning Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
2.2.1.1 Supervised Machine Learning Anomaly Detection
Supervised-based anomaly detection techniques are very commonly used since they often require a pre-
trained accurate model and these techniques in most of the time are accurate enough and give good classifi-
cation and prediction results. However, these techniques suffer from some limitations:
a) Require generally several iterations of training and testing phases in order to generate the best accurate
models,
b) Delay in the deliverance time of analytics results especially when it comes to critical data or projects
that need to be delivered within very fast time delays.
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This family of machine learning can also be devided into several sub-categories according to our litter-
ature review[10, 45] as shown in Figure 2.9.
More precisely, this category is devided into four sub-categories:
a) support vector machine (SVM) based network anomaly detection techniques in which the algorithm
generally require data points and outputs the resulting hyperplane (a simple separating line in a two-
dimension space) that best defines the optimal decision boundary that separates the diffrent targeted
classification class label’s values. In other words, the data points are grouped on the sides of this
hyperplane and each group is considered as an independant class.
b) Random forest based network anomaly detection technique on the other hand belong to the family
of ensemble methods and are used to build predictive models for both classification and prediction
problems. The model built using random forest algorithms creates a forest representation of random
uncorrelated decision trees in order to take the best classification or prediction decision at the end.
c) Decision trees on the other side are quite similar to the previous one (random forests); to be more pre-
cise, decision trees are built on the entire dataset using all the features of interest to the targeted prob-
lem, whereas random forests randomly select observations and specific features to construct multiple
decision trees and computes an average metric on the results. More precisely, each tree contributes
with its own vote, and the class that receives the most votes by majority ruling is considered as the
result of the classification/prediction.
d) Supervised artificial neural networks (SANN) take input vectors in the network and use them to
produce output vectors, these output vectors are then fed to the algorithm which will compare them
with a set of targeted/desired vectors. If an error is detected when there is a considerable diffrence
between the resulting ouputs and the desired ones. This is repeated and each time the weights of
the network are adjusted based on these error values, until the resulting outputs and the desired ones
match.
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Supervised Machine Learning Anomaly Detection





Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Figure 2.9: Classification of Supervised Machine Learning Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
2.2.1.2 Support Vector Machine Anomaly Detection
Suppor vector machine network anomaly detection techniques are devided according to the litterature
review [10, 45] into three main classes, as shown in Figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.10: Classification of Support Vector Machine Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
a) Standard SVM: four prominent works fall into this category. In [51], the authors used gradual feature
removal technique in order to reduce the number of features used to 19 critical ones chosen from
KDDCUP99 [64]. Then, using a combination of clustering techniques, ant colony algorithm, and
support vector machines (SVM), they built an efficient classifier to detect normal and abnormal net-
work traffic. At the end of their work, they evaluated their classifier and showed that it achieves an
accuracy of 98.62% using 10-fold cross validation and an average Matthews correlation coefficient
(MCC) of 86.11%. In [13], the authors proposed mutual information-based feature selection method
for intrusion detection systems. More precisely, two feature selection methods are proposed and their
performance is comapred to a mutual information-based feature seletion method. This comparison is
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achieved using both linear (linear correlation coefficient) and non-linear (mutual information). Fur-
thermore, they proposed an intrusion detection algorithm using their own improved least squres sup-
port vector machines. At the end of their work, they conducted their experiments on KDDCUP1999
[64] dataset and after evaluation and validation, their proposed feature selection algorithm achieved
the highest accuracy results; with an average of 99.8% on normal traffic, 99% on denial of service
(DoS) traffic, 99.83% on probing attacks traffic, 99.91% on remote to login (R2L) traffic, and 93.16%
on user to remote (U2R) traffic compared with other techniques. In [82], a support vector machine
anomaly detection based technique was proposed by authors which analyses tremendous amounts of
NetFlow traffic. Their proposed approach uses a special kernel function which considers both contex-
tual and quantitative features select from NetFlow records. The following Table 2.2 best shows these
accuracy results on diffrent attacks:
Table 2.2: Accuracy results achieved in [82]
Attack Type Accuracy False Positives Rate True Negatives Rate
Nachi Scan 89.6% 0.4% 99.6%
Netbios Scan 93.8% 0% 100%
Popup Scan 91.5% 2.3% 97%
SSH Scan & TCP Flood 91.7% 1.1% 98.9%
DDoS UDP Flood 91.5% 2.2% 97.8%
DDoS TCP Flood 90.7% 3.3% 96.7%
Stealthy DDoS UDP Flood 93.8% 0% 100%
DDoS UDP Flood & Traffic Deletion 93.4% 0% 100%
In [85], a novel algorithm called support vector machine based on the restricted Boltzmann machine
(SVM-RBM) is proposed in order to detect network anomalies. Restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM)
are used during the feature extraction step and choose the best gradient descent algorithm using Spark
in order to train the support vector machine (SVM) classifier. Furthermore, in order to improve the
performance of SVM-RBM, diffrent numbers of hidden units are tested and it was shown that the
SVM classification highly depends on the learning capability of these features using RBM.
b) One-Class SVM: the most prominent work that has been proposed in this category of SVMs is the
work proposed in [75]. The authors proposed a hybrid machine learning approach in order to detect
network anomalies. More precisely, they used self-organized feature map (SOFM) in order to use
SVM without previous knowledge. Then, passive TCP/IP Fingerprinting (PTF) is used in order to
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reject incomplete network traffic that is considered violating TCP/IP standards. After that, a feature
selection technique based on genetic algoritm is used in order to extract optimal information from raw
packets. They also took into account the temporal relationships between data during the preprocess-
ing step and fed them to their Enhanced SVM. Finally, they experimented their technique alongside
with other techniques on both MIT Lincoln Labs dataset alongside with real captured data from real
network traffic, and the validation was achieved using m-fold cross-validation. The following Table
2.3 shows the results of their evaluation:
Table 2.3: Accuracy results achieved in [75]
Approach Kernel Function Detection Rate False Positives Rate False Negatives Rate
Soft Margin SVM Inner Product 90.13% 10.55% 4.36%
Soft Margin SVM Polynomial 91.10% 5% 10.45%
Soft Margin SVM RBF 98.65% 2.55% 11.09%
Soft Margin SVM Sigmoid 95.03% 3.9% 12.73%
Soft Margin SVM Average 93.73% 5.5% 9.66%
Soft Margin SVM Standard Deviation 3.91% 3.51% 3.66%
One-Class SVM Inner Product 53.41% 48% 36%
One-Class SVM Polynomial 54.06% 45% 46%
One-Class SVM RBF 94.65% 20.45% 44%
One-Class SVM Average 67.37% 37.82% 42%
One-Class SVM Standard Deviation 23.62% 15.11% 5.29%
Enhanced SVM Sigmoid 87.74% 10.2% 27.27%
c) Robust SVM: in [38], a comparative study was realised between the performance of robust support
vector machines (RSVMs), conventional/standard SVMs, and nearest neighbor classifiers (KNNs) on
KDDCUP99 [64] dataset. The results of their evaluation show that RSVMs outperform the two other
techniques achieving higher accuracy results with lower false positives rates. Table 2.4 shows these
results:
Table 2.4: Accuracy results achieved in [38]
Approach Attack Detection Rate False Positives Rate
RSVMs 81.8% Less than 1%
SVMs 81.8% Less than 1%
KNN 63.6% Less than 1%
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2.2.1.3 Random Forests Anomaly Detection
As shown in Figure 2.11, there are mainly three important noticeable works using random forests in order to
detect network anomalies. In [87], a random forest network anomaly detection technique was proposed in
order to detect misuse, and abnormal behaviors on IDS networks. For misuse detection, intrusion patterns
are represented by the random forest automatically over the training data. Then, intrusions are detected by
matching network activities against the trained/detected patterns. As for anomalies, outlier detection capa-
bility of random forests are used. This hybrid approach improves the detection performance by combining
the advantages of both misuse and anomaly detection. Their approach was evaluated on KDDCUP99 [64]
dataset and the results of the validation show that this technique outperforms other unsupervised techniques.
Random Forests Anomaly Detection [87, 33, 17]
Figure 2.11: Classification of Random Forests Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
In [33] on the other side, the authors conducted a comparative study between supervised probabilistic
and predictive machine learning techniques for network anomaly detection techniques. More precisely, two
probabilistic techniques Naive Bayes and Gaussian were compared with two other predictive techniques
Decision trees and Random forests. For their evaluation and experiments, KDDCUP99 [64] dataset was
used and the ability of these four techniques to detect four types of attacks was compared. The results of
their comparative study are shown in Table 2.5 :
In [17], a large scalable botnet detection tool called Disclosure was proposed. They selected several
features that are considered important from NetFlow data in order to detect reliably botnets’ command and
control (C&C) centers on benign NetFlow traffic. The evaluation of their approach was conducted on two
large real network traffic datasets (billions of records per day) and proved that Disclosure can detect botnet
C&C channels during very fast time delays. Table 2.6 shows the details about both real large networks used
for the evaluation, and Table 2.7 shows the results of their approach.
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Table 2.5: Detection rates achieved in [33]
Approach Population Size DoS Probe R2L U2R
Gaussian 8020 96.7% 87.3% 13.6% 48.6%
Gaussian 8416 96.7% 87.4% 13.6% 48.6%
Gaussian 8812 84.3% 86% 13.5% 48.6%
Naive Bayes 8020 79.1% 81.6% 12.5% 84.3%
Naive Bayes 8416 79.1% 81.4% 12.5% 81.4%
Naive Bayes 8812 79.1% 81.3% 12.4% 84.3%
Decision Tree 8020 97.2% 73.6% 9.3% 28.6%
Decision Tree 8416 96.8% 77.9% 7.4% 24.3%
Decision Tree 8812 96.6% 74.7% 9% 30%
Random Forest 8020 97.2% 74.5% 5.5% 25.7%
Random Forest 8416 97.1% 75.8% 4.8% 34.3%
Random Forest 8812 97.1% 77.7% 6% 25.7%
Table 2.6: Experimental networks details used in [17]
Network Sampling Flows Per Day Unique IP Addresses
Inter-University Network (N1) 1:1 1.2 billion 28 million
Tier 1 ISP (N2) 1:10:000 400 million 50 million
Table 2.7: Experimental Results Achieved in [17]





2.2.1.4 Decision Trees Machine Anomaly Detection
There are two major works that fall into this class of network anomaly detection techniques. In [44], an ap-
proach using decision trees in order the process of matching used by signature-based techniques is deployed
combined with a set of machine learning clustering techniques. Experimental evaluation of the approach
proves that it detects anomalies in a fast manner compared to Snort’s detection module.
In [18], Exposure, a large scalable system that detects malicious domains using passive DNS analysis
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techniques was proposed. A total set of 15 features was used and extracted from DNS traffic. The ex-
perimental evaluation was conducted on a real-world dataset of 100 billion DNS requests, and a real-life
deployement over two weeks in an ISP, and proved the scalability of their approach alongside with its high
capability of detecting malicious domains used in a variety of malicious activities. Table 2.8 shows the
accuracy results of their approach:
Table 2.8: Experimental Results Achieved in [18]
Validation Method Area Under the Curve (AUC) Detection Rate False Positives Rate
Full Data 99.9% 99.5% 0.3%
10-folds Cross-Validation 98.7% 98.5% 0.9%
66% Percentage Split 98.7% 98.4% 1.1%
Decision Trees Anomaly Detection [44, 18]
Figure 2.12: Classification of Decision Trees Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
2.2.1.5 K-Nearest Neighbor Anomaly Detection
Five prominent research works have been proposed that are based on K-Nearest Neighbor in order to detect
network anomalies. In [53], an approach based on KNN classifier is proposed in order to distinguish between
normal and abnormal (intrusive) programs. This approach works by representing programs behaviors into
system calls frequencies, where each system call is considered as a word and the set of all system calls during
one program’s execution are considered as one document. Then KNN is used to classify these documents
since this method has proven its advantages in the past when it comes to deal with text categorisation. The
evaluation of this approach was conducted on KDDCUP99 [64] dataset and proved that it can detect in
an effictive way intrusive attacks achieving lower false positives rates. Table 2.9 show the results of this
evaluation:
In [69], an approach for anomaly detection was proposed by the authors which used a distributed,
clustering-based algorithm. The approach was evaluated using a simulated environment using sensor (multi-
ple sensors) collected data and demonstrated considerable accuracy results compared to a centralised sensor
scheme.
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Table 2.9: Experimental Results Achieved in [53]
Attack Type Instances Detected Detection Rate
Known Attacks 16 16 100%
Zero-Day Attacks 8 6 75%
Both Attacks 24 22 91.7%
In [20], a novel method was introduced which uses first principal component analysis (PCA) which
projects data elements onto a vector space in order to represent the diffrent variations in those data elemts.
Then, a comparative study is conducted between decision tree and KNN algorithms. The experiments were
conducted on KDDCUP99 [64] dataset and shows that KNN algorithm outperforms decision trees, as shown
in Table 2.10, and in Table 2.11:
Table 2.10: Confusion Matrix achieved by using KNN with PCA in [20]
Predicted As Population Size Benign Probing DoS U2R R2L
Normal 60593 99.5% 0.27% 0.23% 0% 0%
Probing 4166 13.87% 74.4% 11.37% 0% 0.36%
DoS 229853 2.68% 0.18% 97.14% 0% 0%
U2R 228 35.96% 14.47% 39.03% 7.91% 2.63%
R2L 16189 97.49% 1.71% 0% 0% 0.8%
Table 2.11: Confusion Matrix achieved by using Decision Tree algorithm with PCA in [20]
Predicted As Population Size Benign Probing DoS U2R R2L
Normal 60593 99% 0.85% 0.12% 0% 0.03%
Probing 4166 29.6% 66.8% 3.5% 0.10% 0%
DoS 229853 2.42% 0.33% 97.25% 0% 0%
U2R 228 92.98% 0% 0.44% 6.58% 0%
R2L 16189 99.94% 0% 0.06% 0% 0.01%
In [49], a novel supervised network anomaly detection technique based on transductive confidence ma-
chines for k-nearest neighbors (TCM-KNN) was proposed. This approach is able to effectively detect anoma-
lies with higher detection rates, lower false positives rates by using lesser data and selected features com-
pared to the classical approaches. The evaluation that was conducted on KDDCUP99 [64] dataset showed
that this approach outperformed other state of the art techniques, as shown in Table 2.12.
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Table 2.12: Experimental Results Achieved in [49]
Approach True Positives Rates False Positives Rates
SVM 98.7% 2.7%
Neural Network 98.3% 2.2%
KNN 97.7% 4.8%
TCM-KNN 99.6% 0.1%
Last but not least, in [83], payload-based anomaly detection (PAYL) is proposed which analyses the
payload of network traffic in a fully automatic way. During the training step, the profile of the network
payload is built as a byte frequency representation using also standard deviation of the payload flows to each
single network host and its associated port number. Then KNN is used to classify and detect anomalies using
Mahalanobis distance in order to compute the similarity between new data and the pre-computed payload
profile. The performance of their approach was demonstrated using KDDCUP99 [64] dataset and also a real
network traffic collected on the Columbia Computer Science (CS) department network. The results of their
evaluation on both these datasets achieve high accuracy rates; with almost 100% accuracy and 0.1% false
positives rates when it comes to HTTP port (80) network traffic.
K-Nearest Neighbor Anomaly Detection [53, 69, 20, 49, 83]
Figure 2.13: Classification of K-Nearest Neighbor Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
2.2.1.6 Supervised Artificial Neural Networks Anomaly Detection
Supervised artificial neural networks (SANN) on the other hand are categorized according to our litter-
ature review [10, 45] into three main categories, as shown in Figure 2.14:
a) Perceptron Backpropagation Hybrid: One major work has been noticed using this technique: [89],
in which the authors introduced hiearchical intrusion detection (HIDE) which is a tool that detects
network traffic anomalies and attacks using a combination of statistical preprocessing techniques
and neural network classification algorithms. Moreover, they tested five distinct neural network
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Figure 2.14: Classification of Supervised Artificial Neural Networks Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10,
45]
algorithms: Perceptron, Backpropagation (BP), Perceptron Backpropagation Hybrid (PBH), Fuzzy
ARTMAP, and Radial-based Function. The results of their comparative study using these five algo-
rithms showed that both BP and BPH outperform the other three algorithms, and that they both can
effectively detect UDP flooding attacks.
b) Recurrent ANNs: In [54], proposed an approach that uses recurrent ANNs in order to reduce and
fix the problem of high false positives rates in the signature-based intrusion detection techniques.
In order to do so and improve the performance of their system, they used a combination of both
discriminative training and generic keywords representations. Their evaluation and validation was
conducted on KDDCUP99 [64] dataset and achieved 80% of detection rate with approximately one
false alarm (false positive) per day.
c) Feed-Forward ANNs: in [22], a feed-forward ANN based misuse detection system was proposed
in order to overcome one major flaw/drawback of rule-based techniques which consists of missing
detection when it comes to deal with patterns completely diffrent from the expected ones. Their
evaluation was conducted by computing both root mean square error (RMSE) and correlation metrics
and are shown in Table 2.13.
Table 2.13: Experimental Results Achieved in [22]
Training Data RMSE Test Data RMSE Training Data Correlation Test Data Correlation
0.058298 0.069929 0.982333 0.975569
In [65], the authors examined two systems for network anomaly detection using respectively feed-
forward and perceptrons for the first one, and self-organizing maps for the second system. These two
29
systems were evaluated on KDDCUP99 [64] dataset and showed that the learning capability of neural
networks can help improve the detection of abnormal network activity (DoS, Port Scan, DDoS, and
doorknob attacks), as shown in Table 2.14.
Table 2.14: Experimental Results Achieved in [65]
Correct Normal Predictions False Negatives Rates Correct Attack Predictions False Positives Rates
Union of All Attacks 100% 0% 24% 76%
DoS 100% 0% 24% 76%
Last but not least, in [67], a neural network based network anomaly detection approach was proposed
using feed-forward alongside with backpropagation technique in order to train the model on 10% of
KDDCUP99 [64] dataset. The evaluation results showed that the proposed algorithm detects diffrent
attack types in an effective fashion with less false positives and false negatives rates, compared to
some state of the art techniques. These results are shown in Table 2.15.
Table 2.15: Experimental Results Achieved in [67]
Approach Accuracy False Positives Rates False Negatives Rates Number of Epochs
Proposed Approach 94.93% 0.002% 0.7% 1067
Standard ANNs 87.07% 6.66% 6.27% 412
2.2.1.7 Unsupervised Machine Learning Anomaly Detection
Unsupervised machine learning anomaly detection techniques on the other hand are splitted based on our
litterature review and some available surveys on the topic [10, 45] into two main categories: a) Unsupervised
Artificial Neural Networks (UANN): where ANNs are used to detect network anomalies in a completely
unsupervised fashion without requiring training and testing phases. b) Clustering: based network anomaly
detection techniques on the other hand are also unsupervised and work in a way of clustering network data
into diffrent clusters and then make a decision on which clusters’ points to consider as anomalous or not
based on diffrent criterias. Figure 2.15 shows these two categories:
2.2.1.8 Unsupervised Artificial Neural Networks
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Unsupervised Machine Learning Anomaly Detection
Clustering
Unsupervised Artificial Neural Networks
(UANN)
Figure 2.15: Classification of Unsupervised Machine Learning Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
For unsupervised artificial neural networks based network anomaly detection techniques, they can be
splitted into two main categories: a) self-organizing maps: are used to cluster and visualize network data
extensively, whereas b) deep learning: techniques work in a way to mimic the human brain where each
neuron is represented as a node and these nodes are connected with other through multiple layers; inputs
layer, hidden layers, and outputs layer. Figure 2.16 shows these two categories.






Figure 2.16: Classification of Unsupervised Artificial Neural Networks Anomaly Detection Approaches
[10, 45]
• Self-Organizing Maps: As shown in Figure 2.17, this sub-category of unsupervised artificial neural
networks based network anomaly detection techniques has a noticeable major work [70], where the
authors introduced integrated network-based Ohio University network detection service (INBOUNDS)
as a network based intrusion detection system. This tool contains a module called anomalous network-
traffic detection with self-organizing maps (ANDSOM) where self-organized maps were deployed. In
more details, ANDSOM represents each network connection by extracting six features of interest into
a six-dimensional vector. Then, it creates a two-dimensional lattice of neurons for each network
service. After that, and during real-time running of the tool, each coming new network connection is
fed to ANDSOM which attributes its respective self-organized map (SOM), and a distance is computed
between this connection SOM and the closest neuron; if this distance is above a fixed threshold,
then it is considered as an anomalous network connection. The results of their experimentation and
evaluation show that the percentage of false positives for both DNS and HTTP traffic is of 1.18% and
1.16% respectively.
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Self-Organizing Maps Network Based Anomaly Detection [70]
Figure 2.17: Self-Organizing Maps Network Based Anomaly Detection Publications. [10, 45]
• Deep Learning: As shown in Figure 2.18, deep learning network based anomaly detection techniques




Figure 2.18: Classification of Deep Learning Based network Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]




Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
Boltzmann Machine (BM)
Figure 2.19: Classification of Generative Deep Learning Network Based Anomaly Detection Approaches.
[10, 45]
– Boltzmann Machine (BM): The major works that fall into this category of network
anomaly detection techniques mostly are sub-categorized as restricted Boltzmann Machine
(RBM) and in turn to deep belief network (DBN) based techniques, as shown in Figure 2.20.
There are a lot of major works that have been proposed in the past using Boltzmann Ma-
chine (BM) approach; ten of them are considered as important and thus shall be discussed
next.
In [52], a hybrid network anomaly detection technique was introduced which combined
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Figure 2.20: Classification of Boltzmann Machine (BM) Network Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
autoencodes as a dimensionality reduction technique in order to simplify the data repre-
sentation and improve the performance of their algorithm and extract the most important
features. Then, RBMs are used in order to detect malicious code; where the output vector
of the last layer of the RBM is fed as input vector for a backpropagation neural network.
The experimentation and evaluation of their proposed approach showed that the detection
accuracy of this hybrid approach outperforms other systems where only a single DBN is
used. These results are depicted in the following Table 2.16:
Table 2.16: Experimental Results Achieved in [52]
Model Used True Positives Rate False Positives Rates Accuray CPU Time (Seconds)
DBN 95.34% 9.02% 91.4% 1.126
AutoEncoders & DBN (5 Training Iterations and 5 Fine-Tuning Iterations) 96.79% 15.79% 89.75% 2.625
AutoEncoders & DBN (10 Training Iterations and 5 Fine-Tuning Iterations) 93.35% 9.17% 88.95% 1.147
AutoEncoders & DBN (10 Training Iterations and 10 Fine-Tuning Iterations) 92.2% 1.58% 92.1% 1.243
In [12], a novel approach of network anomaly detection using restricted Boltzmann ma-
chines (RBMs) and deep belief networks (DBNs) was proposed. It started by reducing
the features dimensionality by using a one-layer RBM in a complete unsupervised fashion.
Then, the resulting weights of this process are fed to another RBM which in turn produces
a deep belief network (DBN). This second RBM uses a fine-tuning layer which consists of
a logistic regression (LR) classifier using multi-class soft-max. The tool was developed and
implemented using C++ using Microsoft Visual Studio 2013. As for the experimentation
and evaluation of the approach, KDDCUP99 [64] dataset was used for that purpose, and at
the end of this process, the authors showed that this proposed technique outperforms other
pre-existing deep learning techniques in terms of accuracy and detection speed; as shown
in Table 2.17:
In [11], the authors demonstrated the usefullness of restricted Boltzmann machines (RBMs)
in order to detect anomalous and normal NetFlow traffic. The evaluation of their work was
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Table 2.17: Experimental Results Achieved in [12]
Method Accuracy True Positives Rates CPU Time (Seconds)
[12] 97.9% 97.5% 8
[32] (4 Hidden Layers) 93.47% 92.33% N/A
[52] (10 Training Iterations and 10 Fine-Tuning Iterations) 92.10% 92.20% 1.24
conducted on the benchmark dataset of UNBCIC [7].
In [50], the authors proposed a novel approach for detecting network anomalies on power
grid’s flow traffic. Their approach works by first by clustering the data into clusters based on
their time occurrences, then based on the resulting clusters, determine which RBM to use.
Then, by merging the most similar clusters, they choose an oveall RBM model and based on
the pre-computed similarities between the real-time data and the used model, anomalies are
detected. The results of their evaluation step show that their proposed techniques is more
accurate in detecting anomalies on power grid’s flow traffic compared to other techniques.
These results are shown in Table 2.18:
Table 2.18: Experimental Results Achieved in [50]
Method Number of Clusters Average Convergence Tone Per Round (Seconds) Average Accuracy
K-Means 4 32 73%
DBSCAN 10 37 82%
K-RBM [50] 17 45 91%
In [47], a hybrid method for network anomaly detection was proposed by the authors us-
ing a combination of recurrent neural networks (RNNs) and restricted Boltzmann machines
(RBMs). More precisely, distributed embedding technique was used to pre-process network
data and make it suitable for the neural networks models. Then, an RBM model was used in
order to extract feature vectors from network packets and an RNN model was used for the
extraction of network flow features vectors. Finally, a soft-max layer was used which is fed
with these flow vectors detecting anomalies in the result. Their evaluation was conducted
on both UNBCIC [7] and KDDCUP99 [64] datasets and the results showed that their tech-
nique (RNN-RBM) achieves higher detection rates, recall, with lower false positives rates
compared with other state of the art techniques. These results are depicted in the following
Table 2.19:
In [85], a novel algorithm for network anomaly detection was introduced by the authors
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Table 2.19: Experimental Results Achieved in [47]
Algorithm Accuracy Recall (DoS) Recall (Probing) Recall (R2L) Recall (U2R) Average Recall Average FPR
KNN 49.2% N/A N/A N/A N/A 44.9% 46.46%
KNN-DS 37.4% N/A N/A N/A N/A 34.7% 35.29%
SVM 79.4% 81.1% 76.7% 21.4% 11.2% N/A 0.6%
PLSSVM 99.8% 79% 87.6% 88% 18.4% N/A 3.9%
ID3 N/A 99.9% 99.7% 99.5% 49.1% N/A 0.43%
EID3 N/A 99.9% 99.8% 99.7% 99.8% N/A 0.19%
Random Forest 91.4% 91.1% 55.1% 66.7% 100% N/A 2.23%
Bayesian Network 90.6% 94.6% 83.8% 5.2% 30.3% N/A 0.3%
Naive Bayes 78.3% 79.2% 94.8% 0.1% 12.2% N/A 4.05%
MLP N/A 96.9% 74.3% 0.3% 20.1% N/A 0.53%
RNN-Based 95.2% 99.6% 59.7% 0% 38.1% N/A 0.38%
RBF N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 90.7% 5.6%
RNN-RBM [47] 99.3% 99.4% 91.5% 97.7% 93.3% N/A 0.02%
called support vector machine based on the restricted Boltzmann machine (SVM-RBM).
More precisely, RBMs were used in order to extract important features from the data and
then gradient descent algorithm was used alongside with Spark in order to train the support
vector machine (SVM) classifier. Moreover, they tuned their algorithm by using diffrent
numbers of hidden layers in order to improve the performance of SVM-RBM. As for the
evaluation of SBM-RBM, they depicted the precision results achieved using diffrent param-
eters compared with other existing algoritms: Decision Tree (DT), Naive Bayes (NB), and
Neural Network (NN).
In [68], the authors compared between three techniques in order to detect network anoma-
lies on the KDDCUP99 [64] dataset; support vector machines (SVMs), backpropagation
(BP), and deep belief networks (DBNs) using restricted Boltzmann machines (RBMs). The
results of this comparative study (both accuracy and time consumption) are depicted in the
following Table 2.20:
Table 2.20: Experimental Results Achieved in [68]
Model Time (Seconds) Accuracy
Support Vector Machine (SVM) 13.53 91.36%
Backpropagation (BP) 16.85 89.07%
Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) 11.65 95.25%
In [81], a hybrid approach for network anomaly detection was introduced by the authors
called Dynamic Recursive Deep Belief Neural Networks (DRDBNN) which combined both
restricted Boltzmann machines (RBMs) and random forests. In more details, they use RBMs
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first in order to extract the most important features to which they add a time-varying factor
and a forgetting coefficient to improve them. Then, they feed these features to a random
forest classifier which classifies them into normal or anomalous ones. The results of their
evaluation are shown in the following Table 2.21:
Table 2.21: Experimental Results Achieved in [81]
Approach Data Sampling Percentage Detection Rate False Positives Rate
DRDBNN [81] 10% 91.25% 4.85%
DRDBNN [81] 50% 92.27% 4.25%
DRDBNN [81] 80% 93.85% 4.06%
DBNs 10% 88.35% 5.84%
DBNs 50% 89.56% 5.39%
DBNs 80% 91.86% 4.76%
SVMs 10% 85.42% 5.77%
SVMs 50% 87.79% 5.86%
SVMs 80% 87.98% 5.08%
NNs 10% 83.56% 6.72%
NNs 50% 84.77% 6.09%
NNs 80% 86.93% 6.25%
In [90], in order to deal with the issue of redundant information, huge data size, and time-
consuming training phases, a novel network anomaly detection approach was proposed us-
ing both restricted Boltzmann machines (RBMs) and probabilistic neural networks (PNNs).
First, by using the nonlinear learning capability of DBNs, features and attributes of impor-
tance are extracted. Then, in order to improve the training performance, Particle Swarm
Optimization (PSO) algorithm is used to find the optimal number of nodes per hidden layer.
Finally, PNNs are used in order to classify the results as anomalous or not. The evalua-
tion of the work was conducted on KDDCUP99 [64] dataset and the results prove that this
hybrid approach outperforms conventional techniques (PNN, PCA-PNN, and unoptimized
DBN-PNN). These results are depicted in the following Table 2.22:
Table 2.22: Experimental Results Achieved in [90]
Approach Running Time (Seconds) Accuracy Detection Rate False Positives Rates
Unoptimized DBN-PNN 5.71 99.31% 91.75% 0.375%
Optimized DBN-PNN [90] 5.48 99.14% 93.25% 0.615%
PCA-PNN 6.16 98.28% 89% 1.33%
PNN 35.38 99.04% 89.25% 0.55%
Last but not least, and to conclude the most prominent works published in this sub-category,
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in [48], a novel approach for intrusion detection on heavy-duty robots was introduced which
uses an algorithm called improved deep belief networks (IDBNs) and dynamic modeling.
First, it had a security checking process which is able to detect targeted attacks from a
specific cyber-domain. Then, a module for dynamic modeling and security detction is used
to detect critical attacks that can cause physical damages.
– Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs): The major works and publications that fall into re-
current neural networks based network anomaly detection category, as shown in Figure
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Figure 2.21: LSTM-based Network Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
In [57], a novel approach for anomaly detection called bidirectional Long-Short Term Mem-
ory using Denoising Autoencoders (BLSTM-DAE) where they process auditory spectral fea-
tures. They use the reconstruction error obtained from autoencoders as an activation sig-
nal. This autoencoder is trained on a publicly available dataset which contains in-home
situations like: watching televison scenarios, and playing scenarios. Their evaluation was
conducted on more than 260 abnormal events and the results were compared with existing
state of the art techniques, showing that this approach outperforms them. Table 2.23 shows
these evaluation’ results:
Table 2.23: Experimental Results Achieved in [57]
Approach Precision Recall F1_Score
GMM 91.1% 87.8% 89.4%
HMM 94.1% 88.9% 91.4%
LSTM-CAE 91.7% 86.6% 89.1%
BLSTM-CAE 93.6% 89.2% 91.3%
LSTM-DAE 94.2% 90.6% 92.4%
BLSTM-DAE [57] 94.7% 92.0% 93.4%
In [43], a novel intrusion detection system (IDS) was proposed by the authors which applies
the principle and architecture’s design of Long-Short Term Memory networks (LSTMs) to a
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recurrent neural network (RNN) called LSTM-RNN, training the model on the KDDCUP99
[64] dataset. After the evaluation of their system’s performance, the resulting accuracy
measures showed that this technique outperforms other existing state of the art techniques,
as shown in Table 2.24:
Table 2.24: Experimental Results Achieved in [43]
Approach Detection Rate False Positives Rates Accuracy
GRNN 59.12% 12.46% 87.54%
PNN 96.33% 3.34% 96.66%
RBNN 69.83% 6.95% 93.05%
KNN 45.74% 46.49% 90.74%
SVM 87.65% 6.12% 90.4%
Bayesian 77.6% 17.57% 88.46%
LSTM-RNN [43] 98.88% 10.04% 96.93%
In [41], the authors proposed a hybrid approach using both ensemble methods and Long-
Short Term Memory (LSTMs) networks which was able to detect anomalies on system calls.
It is able to merge multiple thresholding classifiers into a single one and has the advantage of
learning the semantics and interactions of each system call compared with other techniques.
The validity and performance of their approach was evaluated on various publicly available
benchmark datasets. The results of this evaluation are shown in the following Table 2.25:
Table 2.25: Experimental Results Achieved in [41]
Benchmark Dataset Area Under the Curve (AUC) False Positives Rate Detection Rate
KDDCUP99 [64] 99.4% 2.3% 100%
UNM 96.9% 5.5% 99.8%
In [78], a study was conducted by the authors in order to evaluate the performance of
Long-Short Term Memory recurrent neural networks (LSTM-RNN) in detecting network
anomalous traffic. The results of their evaluation which was conducted on KDDCUP99
[64] showed that this technique is able to learn and detect all the types of attacks present in
the benchmark dataset.
In [86], a deep learning approach for intrusion detection using recurrent neural networks
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called RNN-IDS was introduced. Moreover, and in order to tune the performance of the
approach, different number of neurons and learning parameters were tested. After com-
parison with other state of the art techniques like J48, artificial neural networks, random
forests, support vector machines (SVMs) and many others, it was concluded that their tech-
nique outperforms them in terms of accuracy measures; with 99.53% accuracy using 80
hidden nodes (neurons) and 0.5 learning rate value on KDDTrain, 81.29% accuracy using
the same configuration on KDDTest, and 64.67% of accuracy using the same configuration
on KDDTest-21, achieving 11444 seconds of training time.
In [19], a novel approach was proposed in order to detect collective network anomalies
on time-series using Long-Short Term Memory Recurrent Neural Networks (LSTM-RNN).
Their approach works differently in a way that it is trained on normal time-series data before
predicting future time-series. Then, the prediction errors from the number of latest time-
series steps is considered as collective anomaly if it is above a threshold. The model was
trained on a time-series representation of the KDDCUP99 [64] benchmark dataset and the
evaluation of this technique proves that it can detect collective anomalies efficiently. The
evaluation results are shown in Table 2.26:
Table 2.26: Experimental Results Achieved in [19]





In [30], a novel network time-series anomaly detection technique was proposed by the au-
thors using stacked Long-Short Term Memory networks based on softmax activation func-
tion classifier which is able to predict new packages’ signatures. The evaluation of the
approach was conducted on a real dataset created from a gas pipeline SCADA system, and
the results showed that this technique outperforms other state of the art methods (Table
2.27).
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Table 2.27: Experimental Results Achieved in [30]
Approach Precision Recall Accuracy F1_Score
Proposed Approach in [30] 94% 78% 92% 85%
BF 97% 59% 87% 73%
BN 97% 59% 87% 73%
SVDD 95% 21% 76% 34%
IF 51% 13% 70% 20%
GMM 79% 44% 45% 59%
PCA-SVD 65% 28% 17% 27%
In [42], and in order to build an IDS classifier using deep learning paradigm, a novel Long-
Short Term Memory Recurrent Neural Network (LSTM-RNN) model using Nadam Opti-
mizer was proposed. Several iterations of training were conducted where six other opti-
mizers where tested and the latter one (Nadam) was chosen as the best one. After extensive
evaluation and experimentation on KDDCUP99 [64] benchmark dataset, the following clas-
sification performance metrics shown in Table 2.28 were computed:
Table 2.28: Experimental Results Achieved in [42]
Optimizer Accuracy Recall False Positives Rate Precision Efficiency
RMSprop 94.96% 97.70% 15.36% 95.98% 7.07
Adagrad 96.78% 99.14% 12.27% 96.88% 8.57
Adadelta 94.40% 99.07% 23.12% 94.22% 5.40
Adam 95.91% 98.72% 12.87% 96.75% 8.20
Adamax 97.37% 98.62% 10.64% 97.59% 9.30
Nadam 97.54% 98.95% 9.98% 97.69% 9.98
In [23], an improved network anomaly detection technique was proposed using a combina-
tion of stacked convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and gated recurrent units (GRUs) was
proposed by the authors in which they detect anomalous system calls which is called CNN-
GRU. After several experiments, they concluded that by stacking multiple CNN layers be-
fore using GRU layer improves the accuracy and execution time compared with approaches
using only LSTMs. The results of their experimentation and evaluation are depicted in the
following Table 2.29:
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Table 2.29: Experimental Results Achieved in [23]
Approach RNN Units Training Time (Seconds) Testing Time (Seconds) Area Under the Curve (AUC)
GRU 200 376 444 66%
LSTM 200 4444 541 74%
CNN+GRU 200 390 441 80%
CNN+GRU 500 402 493 79%
CNN+GRU 600 413 533 81%
In [61], a novel network anomaly detection technique was introduced using sequential au-
toencoder alongside Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) networks. First, autoencoders are
used in order to reduce the data dimensionality and extract the necessary and important
features. Then, LSTMs are used to classify these sequential data representations obtained
from the autoencoder; using a fixed threshold which is based on a cross-validation pro-
cess, resulting in the incoming network traffic being classified as either anomalous or nor-
mal.Moreover, their techniques is efficient in detecting both known and unknown (zero-day)
anomalies and network attacks. Finally, through an extensive experimentation and evalu-
ation, the results showed that their proposed approach has good performance, dynamicity,
robustness, and scalability. Table 2.30 shows the performance metrics computed during this
evaluation:
Table 2.30: Experimental Results Achieved in [61]
Approach Threshold F1_Score Area Under the Curve (AUC)
LSTM 0.008 84.09% 95.19%
GRU 0.006 81.02% 94.78%
Bi-LSTM 0.008 84.61% 95.12%
NN1 - 1 Layer 0.008 83.52% 94.99%
LSTM AutoEncoder with Last Pooling 0.076 84.09% 95.07%
LSTM AutoEncoder with Max Pooling 0.076 85.38% 95.12%
LSTM AutoEncoder with Mean Pooling 0.079 80.72% 94.71%
[61] 0.076 85.38% 95.12%
In [25], in order to detect network anomalies and attacks in Internet of Things (IoT) fog-to-
things communications, a novel approach was introduced using Long-Short Term Memory
(LSTMs). This proposed technique is able to efficiently detect critical attacks and threats
which target IoT devices, and more precisely, the ones which exploit vulnerabilities found
on wireless communication devices. The experimentation of their work on two different
scenarios prove the performance and efficiency of their technique compared to other state
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of the art techniques. Table 2.31 shows the results of this extensive evaluation:
Table 2.31: Experimental Results Achieved in [25]
Approach Benchmark Dataset Accuracy Recall Precision
LSTM [25] UNBCIC [7] 99.91% 99.96% 99.85%
LSTM [25] AWID 98.22% 98.9% 98.5%
LR UNBCIC [7] 90% 99% 89.11%
LR AWID 84.87% 90% 85%
In [80], a novel intrusion detection system for software defined networking (SDN) using
gated recurrent unit recurrent neural network (GRU-RNN) was introduced. The proposed
approach was tested and evaluated using the NSL-KDD benchmark dataset and the results
of this evaluation showed that this proposed technique achieves higher accuracy compared
to other state of the art techniques, using only a set of six features. Table 2.32 shows these
results:






– AutoEncoders: As shown in Figure 2.22, there are four main works and publications that
use mainly autoencoders in order to detect network anomalies.
AutoEncoders [63, 14, 29, 60]
Figure 2.22: Publications Using AutoEncoders for Their Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
In [63], a novel network anomaly detection techniques was proposed by the authors which
combined both autoencoders and density estimation. First, an autoencoder reproduced the
input data in the output layer, resulting into a compressed representation of the data within
the smallest hidden layer. Then, they considered anomalies the ones resulting with lower
density within the hidden layer by studying two scenarios for the density function: Guassian
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and full kernel density estimation. Their approach was evaluated on the benchmark NSL-
KDD dataset and shows that the proposed approach outperforms previous best results. Table
2.33 shows the results of this evaluation.
Table 2.33: Experimental Results Achieved in [63]
Attack Type Approach Area Under the Curve (AUC)
DoS OCAE 96%
DoS OCCEN [63] 95.6%
DoS OCKDE [63] 97.4%
R2L OCAE 90.9%
R2L OCCEN [63] 83.9%
R2L OCKDE [63] 89.1%
U2R OCAE 92.8%
U2R OCCEN [63] 88.8%
U2R OCKDE [63] 94.5%
Probing OCAE 97.1%
Probing OCCEN [63] 98.6%
Probing OCKDE [63] 98.7%
In [14], by using the reconstruction probability from variational autoencoder, a novel
anomaly detection technique was proposed called variational autoencoder (VAE). This
probabilistic value measures the variation of the variables’ distributions. In contrary to
reconstruction error which is generally used by autoencoders, reconstruction probability
is considered by the authors of this work as more suitable to be used as an anomaly score
metric. The results of their evaluation proved that their proposed technique outperforms
the classical approaches using either autoencoders or principal component analysis (PCA).
This evaluation was conducted on KDDCUP99 [64] benchmark dataset and the results are
depicted in the following tables; Table 2.34 shows the results obtained on traffic labelled as
benign, whereas Table 2.35 shows the results obtained on traffic labelled as malicious:
In [29], a novel anomaly detection technique using deep autoencoder (DAE) was introduced
called DAE-IDS. Their model training was conducted in a greedy layer-wise fashion in order
to avoid overfitting and local optima. The evaluation was conducted on KDDCUP99 [64]
benchmark dataset and the results showed that their proposed approach outperforms other
state of the art deep learning existing techniques in terms of accuracy, detection rate, and
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Table 2.34: Experimental Results Achieved in [14] on normal traffic.





Table 2.35: Experimental Results Achieved in [14] on malicious traffic.





false positives rates, as shown in Table 2.36:
Table 2.36: Experimental Results Achieved in [29].
Method True Positives Rates Accuracy
DAE-IDS [29] 94.42% 94.71%
DBN 92.33% 93.49%
AutoEncoder+DBN 92.20% 92.10%
In [60], a hybrid anomaly detection technique was proposed which combined both stacked
autoencoders (SAE) and support vector machines (SVM) called DL-SVM. In more details,
the authors used stacked autoencoders (SAE) for the dimensionality reduction of all the fea-
tures and extract only those of interest. whilst support vector machines (SVM) are used as a
binary classifier in order to classify the data into either anomalous or benign network traffic.
The experimentation and evaluation was conducted on UNBCIC [7] benchmark dataset and
the results showed that their approach outperforms state of the art existing techniques were
only SVMs were used. The following Table 2.37 shows these results:
b) Self-taught Learning: in this category, there is one main work and publication that is of interest
as shown in Figure 2.23.
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Table 2.37: Experimental Results Achieved in [60].
Method Accuracy Precision Recall False Positives Rate ROC F1_Score
PCA-SVM 85.6% 88% 84.9% 13.6% 85.6% 84.7%




Figure 2.23: Publications Using Self-taught Learning for Their Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
In [39], a novel flexible and efficient network anomaly detection technique which uses self-
taught learning (STL) was introduced by the authors. The evaluation of this work was conducted
on the NSL-KDD benchmark dataset and was compared with other state of the art anomaly
(softmax regression (SMR)) detection techniques in terms of accuracy, precision, recall, and f-
measure. The following Table 2.38 shows the results of this evaluation:
Table 2.38: Experimental Results Achieved in [39].
Method Accuracy Precision Recall F1_Score
SMR (2-class) 78% 97.3% 96.2% 96.8%
SMR (5-class) 75% 86% 62% 73%
STL [39] (2-class) 98% 99% 97% 98%
STL [39] (5-class) 98% 84% 70% 75%
2.2.1.9 Clustering-based Anomaly Detection Techniques
Clustering based anomaly detection techniques on the other hand are categorized according to our litter-
ature review and to these two surveys into three sub-categories:
a) K-Means: where a parameter k which represents the number of clusters to be detected is defined
generally by the user and aims to group/cluster the data into these groups/clusters.
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expectation-maximization clustering (EM): is kind of an improvement and extension to k-means cluster-
ing where an object is assigned to a cluster which it is similar to based on this cluster’s mean.
outlier detection: is a clustering technique that detects patterns of data points that do not conform to the
expected behaviors (outliers). As shown in Figure 2.24.
Clustering
Outlier Detection [16]
Expectation-Maximization (EM) Clustering [79]
K-Means [40]
Figure 2.24: Publications Using Clustering for Their Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
a) K-Means Clustering: In [40], a novel hybrid anomaly detection approach was proposed in order to
detect network anomalies in content-centric networks (CCNs). This approach combined both particle
swarm optimization (pso) and k-means clustering during the training phase in order to choose the best
number of clusters k. During the second phase, it used fuzzy logic alongside two distance metrics in
order to detect anomalies. The experimental results proved that this combination during the training
phase achieves better accuracy results when the optimal number of clusers k is chosen, and it also
outperforms other state of the art methods.
b) Expectation-Maximization (EM) Clustering: In [79], a comparative study in terms of accuracy and
false positives rates has been conducted between k-means, k-meloids, EM clustering, and distance-
based outlier detection in order to decide which one is best fit for intrusion detection on network
data. The experimental results showed that both distance-based outlier detection and EM clustering
approaches outperform the other techniques as shown in Table 2.39:
Table 2.39: Experimental Results Achieved in [79].
Method Accuracy False Positives Rate
k-Means 57.81% 22.95%
Improved k-Means 65.4% 21.52%
k-Meloids 76.71% 21.83%
EM Clustering 78.06% 20.74%
Distance-based Outlier Detection 80.15% 21.14%
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c) Outlier Detection: In [16], an outlier detection technique was proposed in order to detect anomalies
on network traffic datasets. The technique started by selecting the appropriate non-redundant features
by applying generalized entropy metric. Then, a tree-based clustering technique is applied to generate
a set of reference points. Finally, it computed outlier scores using outlier rank function to detect
possible outliers. The experiments were conducted on both KDDCUP99 [64] and NSL-KDD datasets
in order to evaluate their approach, and the results show that their proposed technique outperforms
other state of the art techniques.
2.2.2 Statistical Anomaly Detection
In this category of network anomaly detection techniques, there are two major works that we deem as
important for our study, as shown in Figure 2.25
Statistical [21, 31]
Figure 2.25: Classification of Statistical Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
In [21], a statistical network anomaly detection technique using multivariate statistical process controll
(MSPC) technique based on principal component analysis (PCA) was thoroughly studied and evlauted in or-
der to assess its accuracy metrics.They also concluded at the end of their study that MSPC-PCA outperforms
the standard MSPC approach and other state of the art techniques.
In [31], an anomaly detection technique that combines both principal component analysis (PCA) statisti-
cal and ant colony optimization metaheuristic techniques was presented by the authors. These two combined
techniques generate network traffic profile or signature called Digital Signature of Network Segment using
Netflow analysis (DSNSF) and is considered by the authors as normal traffic signature. Then, this generated
signature was compared with real-world network traffic by introducing a modified version of the Dynamic
Time Warping metric in order to differentiate between normal and abnormal traffic. The experiments were
conducted on real network traffic in order to evaluate the approach and the results showed that this technique
improves the detection rate by maintaining a good and low false positives rate.
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2.2.3 Soft-Computing Anomaly Detection
There are many works that have been achieved using soft-computing paradigm in order to build network
anomaly detection tools, but in this document and related to our work, we consider only one major work as
prominent as shown in Figure 2.26:
Soft-Computing [36]
Figure 2.26: Classification of Soft-Computing Anomaly Detection Approaches. [10, 45]
In [36], a network anomaly detection approach that combined both a Genetic Algorithm and Fuzzy Logic
is introduced. First, the technique defined a batch interval of five minutes; where four nominal features (sr-
c/dst IPs and Ports) are converted into numerical single values using Shannon Entropy metric, and numerical
features (src/dst number of bytes and packets) were summerized into single values using their sum during
this interval; the results of this step were considered by the authors as the normal traffic behavior/profile
signature. Then, Genetic Algorithm was used to generate the network’s predicted/expected behavior/profile
signature called Digital Signature of Network Segment using Netflow analysis (DSNSF) using the same set
fo features. After that, an adaptive threshold was defined on the normal traffic profile by using the exponen-
tial weighted moving average (EWMA) metric. After that, fuzzy logic was used with Guassian Membership
Function in order to compute anomaly scores on each of these features using the pre-computed profiles
(normal, predicted/expected, and thresholds). Finally, the same metric used for computing the thresholds
(EWMA) was used on these computed anomaly scores in order to decide whether one of these features was
anomalous or normal at a specific time. The results obtained by applying this technique on real network
traffic flows achieved an accuracy of 96.53% and a false positives rate of 0.56%, the results also proved that
this approach outperforms other state of the art techniques.
As a conclusion to this litterature review on the most prominent existing network anomaly detec-
tion techniques we can say that each technique has its own advantages and limitations. Machine learning
techniques have the advantage of better accuracy results and attack detection rates over the other tech-
niques. However these techniques suffer from scalability issues since they often require training iterations
(supervised) and are time consuming (unsupervised), delaying the delivrance of our analytics results to our
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partners. Moreover, supervised techniques also often require to know the attack signature or pattern in or-
der to detect it which makes them weak and sometimes unable to detect zero-day threats. Statistical and
sof-computing techniques on the other hand are better to use when it comes to scalability, since they are
fast compared to machine learning techniques (statistical techniques) and they are much better to use in an




In this chapter we present our porposed network anomaly detection approach in more details. We first give
an overview of the approach, then we explain each step in full details and present the predictive algorithm
that we proposed.
3.1 Approach Overview
An overview of our approach is represented in Figure 3.1, which consists of four major steps: feature
extraction, adaptive thresholding, predictive analysis, and anomaly detection. In the feature extraction
step, the features that are considered as paramount to our anomaly detection system are extracted. More
specifically, we extract a set of eight features that can be found in any IDS logs in order to achieve system
interoperability. We further summarize the network behavior/profile for each of the chosen features within
a time batch of five minutes. The obtained eight time series representations are considered as the first input
and observed network behavior/profile to our anomaly detection system.
In the next phase, an adaptive threshold using the exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) [56]
statistical metric is calculated for each of the pre-computed network behavior profiling time-series. The
reason of using such technique is that daily users’ Internet connections are in some way auto-correlated over
time [56]; meaning that each user connection on the Internet is mostly affected by his/her past interactions
and not completely random, and the interactions’ influences (weights) on the current connection decreases
back in time. Therefore, we utilize a metric that best captures and defines these weights.
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Figure 3.1: Proposed Anomaly Detection Approach
In the predictive analysis step, we consider a time-window of one hour and try to predict the expected
behavior of each of these network features within the same time frame without any noise or seasonal trends.
Consequently, we utilize the particle swarm optimization (PSO) optimization algorithm, which is designed
to mimic the social behavior of some animals (e.g., birds and fishes) [27]. We modify and adapt this algo-
rithm to our objectives by defining the fitness function as the augmented Dickey-Fuller (adfuller) test [62],
which examines the stationarity of a given time series as input.
Finally, in the last step, we take as input the three pre-computed time series for each feature and compute
the corresponding anomaly scores. More specifically, a fuzzy logic inference system which has two main
Fuzzification and Defuzzification phases is utilized. In Fuzzification phase, a membership function (Gaussian
membership function) is applied on the time series, in which the anomaly scores are computed. Afterwards,
in the Defuzzification phase, the adaptive thresholding is applied on these scores, and further according to
obtained scores and their representative threshold, the associated features are flagged as either anomalousor
non-anomalous.
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3.2 Anomaly Detection by Time-series
In this section, we describe our time-series based anomaly detection approach, which is combined with
an optimization algorithm (particle swarm optimization). Moreover, we describe the dataset used for our
experimentation and demonstrate how to validate the performance of our approach.
3.2.1 Feature Extraction
Prior anomaly detection process, a set of features should be extracted. This task is primordial as it affects the
final results of the approach tremendously. Many works have been achieved in the field of network anomaly
detection in order to determine what are the features that give better insights of the network behavior [34,
46, 36]. In this work, we aim at not merely gather a set of attributes that best describe the network profile
and behavior, but also obtain an anomaly detection system, which works with any IDS logs, such as BRO,
Snort and Surricata IDSs. Achieving the latter property provides the interoperability to our proposed system.
Therefore, we target the possible features that are present in any IDS system. According to the aforesaid
criteria and alongside with some literature review [46] regarding this objective, we extract the set of eight
features of Originator IP Address, Responder IP Address, Originator TCP/UDP Port, Responder TCP/UDP
Port, number of bytes sent by the originator IP, number of bytes sent by the responder IP, number of packets
sent by the originator IP, and number of packets sent by the originator IP.
On the other hand, we receive the connection logs in the order of millions (sometimes hundreds of
millions connection logs) per day, and therefore there would be a scalability issue to process all of these
connection logs in a reasonable time. Therefore, to address the scalability issue we propose to use time-
batches splitting [36] of five minutes to reduce the amount of processing time.
Our approach is a time-series based technique, which accepts numerical values in order to build the
time-series representations. However, the type of the first four selected features (Originator and Responder
IP Addresses, and Originator and Responder TCP/UDP Ports)is nominal. In order to convert nominal
attributes to numerical representations, inspired by [46], we choose to use Shannon Entropy [36, 46, 72] as a
summarization tool to represent the distribution of the features. Additionally, the authors prove that feature
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distributions enable the detection of a wide range of network anomalies, including unknown anomalies.
The authors further demonstrate that studying these distributions can lead to an automatic unsupervised
classification (clustering) represented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Effect of various anomalies on different feature distributions [46]










A single infected host is used to at-
tack a victim and disable some ser-
vices




Multiple infected hosts and internet
connections are used to target a sin-
gle host
High - - -
Port Scanning A large amount of traffic is sent to
a small amount of destination IPs
using large amount of destination
ports
- Low - High
Network Scan-
ning
A large amount of traffic is sent to a
large amount of destination IPs us-
ing a small amount of destination
ports
- High - Low
Outage Events The traffic amount goes down due
to the fact that a service went down,
equipment failure, or maintenance
operations.
≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0
Flash Crowd At-
tacks
A huge surge in the amount of traf-
fic going to one single destination
IP
Low Low
The intuition behind studying traffic features distributions is that the majority of network attacks affect
the distributions of aforementioned attributes. For instance, consider a DDOS attack in which multiple
source hosts (compromised machines) flood the targeted destination machine until the aimed goal is achieved
(take down a specific service). By looking at the distributions of both source and destination IPs it could be
inferred whether there is any spike/surge in the source IPs distribution and a drop-down in the destination
IPs distributions, which leads to the detection of anomalies/attacks.
Shannon Entropy is a good metric to represent the degree of dispersal or concentration of any distribution
53
and quantify these changes in a single numerical value. Given an attribute X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, where xi
is the frequency of the ith attribute sample with the targeted time-batch (five minutes), the Shannon Entropy,












Finally, we also need to quantify the other four numerical values (sent bytes and packets from both
originator and responder IPs) into a single value. For this purpose, inspired by [36] we simply consider
the cumulative sum of each one of their values during the specific time-batch. By performing all the pre-
processing steps, we end up with a full time-series representations (eight time-series, one for each feature)
for the observed network behavior over the time.
3.2.2 Adaptive Thresholding
The next step of our approach consists of finding a metric to compute the thresholds of our pre-computed
time-series representations. We deal with Internet connections, which are auto-correlated; meaning that
the behaviors of users using a specific network are not random and thus they are affected mostly by their
past interactions on the Internet. Therefore, we use the exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) as
such metric. EWMA is a statistical metric that allows analysts to monitor the average of the data by giving
more importance to the most recent data observations. This weighting system is computed in exponential
fashion using all prior data observations. Considering that we have a time-series based representation of
data observations in a specific time-window, EWMA is computed as follows [56]:
EWMAt =

X1, , if: t = 1
α.Xt + (1− α) .Xt−1 , if: t > 1
(3.2)
where X1 is the network observation at the time t = 1, Xt is the current network feature observation, Xt−1
is the most recent (previous) network feature observation, and α is the weighting exponential factor which
falls between 0 and 1 and is computed as α = e−(

σ ) [6], where  represents the time elapsed since the
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time-window started until the current observation, and σ represents the size of the time window (in our case
it is set to one hour).
In addition, EWMA is a good statistical metric for measuring historical volatility, which represents the
degree of dispersion for a given dataset over a defined period of time [8]. There are two main approaches to
measure the volatility of data over time, namely Implicit and Historical [8]. Historical approaches assume
that past data observations are essential for the prediction of future observations. Implicit approaches, on
the other hand, ignore the past observations completely, and try to predict future observations based on the
current observations. The fact that we are dealing with Internet connection logs implies that there are some
auto-correlations (inter-connections) between the current and the past (most recent) internet connections of
the users.
These summarization techniques have a major drawback in the way that all past observations during
the time-window will have the same influence or weighting system [8]. This weakness would significantly
influence and affect our results. Let’s take an example where we have Internet connection logs over one
month, and during let’s say the 24th day of this month a DDOS attack occurred affecting all the source IPs
in the logs that we receive. The next day (25th), this DDOS attack led the services to shut down or outage
of most services on the targeted hosts (source) or IPs. If one applies the approach where the same weights
are applied to all the observations of that month, this will terribly affect our system in the way that when
computing the measure for the 25th day, and considering that the time window is of one month, the same
importance will be given to the day when the attack occurred (previous day) but also to all previous days of
the month. However by applying EWMA and computing the historical volatility measure for the day after
the attack occurred (25th), the previous and most recent day (24th) will be given much more weight and
importance over the previous days of the month, leading to capturing more patterns of the attack from the
network flow attributes.
3.2.3 Predictive Analysis
The next step of our anomaly detection system consists of predicting the normal network profile or behavior.
One common and simple approach that is generally applied would be computing the differences between
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observed (real) network traffic and computed (fixed) thresholds and in the case of positive results, infer that
the real traffic is anomalous (above thresholds), otherwise no anomaly is detected. However, since we are
dealing with daily Internet connection logs, which are not pre-filtered (or pre-cleaned); meaning that they
contain a huge number of false positives. For instance, each day thousands or even hundreds of thousands
of users and academics connect to Google website, if we consider only the two pre-computed steps (feature
extraction and adaptive thresholding), we would end up with a lot of misleading attacks classifications and
false positives (it could be classified as a DDOS attack). Therefore, we extend these two steps with another
predictive step, which tries to delete most of these false positives; in other words, given a real network raw
traffic, we ask our system how much clean the network traffic should look like?
In order to do so, we opt for using an optimization algorithm, namely particle swarm optimization
(PSO) [27, 58, 84] as shown in Algorithm 1, which achieves the desired goal of this step. PSO is a meta-
heuristic global optimization technique that belongs to the family of swarm intelligence algorithms [27].
It is based in analogy with the social behavior of certain animals and most precisely bird flocks and fish
schools. In PSO, the ensemble or set of possible solutions to the optimization task are called a swarm and
each element of this swarm is called a particle. These particles move and change their positions in the search
(parameter) space based on their own and neighbors’ best performances. Therefore, this evolution process
of the swarm is based on two main principles: cooperation and competition among these particles across
multiple generations (several iterations).
Algorithm 1 Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithmic Description [27, 58, 84]
• Initialization Process: For each of the N particles:
1: Initilize the position xi(0)∀i ∈ N
2: Set the particle’s best personal or local position as its initial position: pi(0) = xi(0)
3: Compute the fitness of the particle and if f (xj(0)) ≥ f (xi(0)) ∀i = j initialize the swarm global best
as: g = xj(0)
• Repeat the following steps until the pre-defined criterias are met:
4: Update the particle velocity according to the equation (3.6).
5: Update the particle position according to the equation (3.5).
6: Compute the fitness of the particle f (xi(t+ 1))
7: if f (xi(t+ 1)) ≥ f (pi), update the particle’s personal or local best as: pi = xi(t+ 1)
8: if f (xi(t+ 1)) ≥ f (g), update the swarm’s global best as: g = xi(t+ 1)
• Once the stopping criterias are met and the iterations are stopped, the best solution to the
problem is represented by g.
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Accordingly, in PSO, each particle is defined in the D-dimensional search space, where D repre-
sents the set of parameters to be optimized. The position of the ith particle is defined by the fol-
lowing vector xi = [xi1, xi2, xi3, . . . , xiD], and the population (swarm) of N candidate solutions is
X = {x1, x2, x3, . . . , xN}. In their journey of finding the optimal solution, each particle updates its own
position using xi(t + 1) = xi(t) + vi(t + 1), where t and t+1 represent two successive iterations of the
algorithm and vi represents a vector called the velocity, which governs the way the particle changes its po-
sition across the search space. The velocity parameter is defined according to three factors: (i) Inertia or
Momentum: represents the previous velocity of the same partcile (previous iteration of the algorithm) and
helps prevent from drastic position changes. (ii) Cognitive Component: represents the possibility of the
partcile to return to the previous position. (iii) Social Component: identifies the ability of the particle to
move forward the best solution of the whole swarm.
Based on these definitions, the velocity of the ith particle is defined as vi(t + 1) = vi(t) +
c1 (pi − xi(t))R1 + c2 (g − xi(t))R2, where pi represents the particle’s best solution (local or personal
best), while g represents the global best (the overall best solution found by the whole swarm). The two
real-values of c1 and c2 are called acceleration constants that define the way by which the particle moves to-
ward the global best solution. On the other hand, R1 and R2 represent respectively two diagonal matrices of
randomly generated numbers from a uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1]. For both cognitive and social
components to influence the particle’s velocity in a stochastic way, the acceleration constants are generally
set to 2 so that they meet the 0 ≤ c1.c2 ≤ 4 criteria [58].
In order to get the PSO work correctly, the fitness or objective function, which defines the stopping
criteria of the optimization task needs to be defined. In this work, we aim our predicted time-series to achieve
stationary. The reason behind this logic is the fact that time-series statistical summarization techniques (such
as the mean, variance, and standard deviation) do not give consistent results due to the presence of trends and
seasonal effects (presence of periodic fluctuations). While time-series are stationary, they are not bounded by
the time and summary statistics are more consistent. In addition, they can easily be modelled by statistical
modelling approaches (e.g., forecasting techniques). Thus, it is always recommended to check if a time-
series representation is stationary, and if not, make it stationary by the removal of any trends and seasonal
effects before moving to analysing the residual effects [5].
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One of the most frequently used stationary tests techniques is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ad-
fuller) [62], which is a type of statistical test and autoregressive model for stationary that belongs to the unit
root tests family. In adfuller algorithm, a time-series is considered as non-stationary if one of its monomials
is equal to 1; this is equivalent to say that it can be defined in function of some specific trend (case of null
hypothesis satisfied). On the other hand, if this test is rejected (alternate hypothesis satisfied), none of its
monomials would be equal to 1, therefore it is considered as stationary [5].
In our work, once we build our representation of the network traffic behavior or profile (feature extraction
phase), we then call adfuller test on each of the features’ time-series. If at least one of the eight time-series
is found as non-stationary (null hypothesis satisfied), then we trigger our PSO implementation in order to
remove the presence of any trends and seasonal effects on that specific time-series. Otherwise (in the case of
alternate hypothesis satisfied and thus the null hypothesis is rejected), if all the time-series are stationary, we
do not trigger our PSO implementation and consider for our anomaly detection module only the observed
behavior and the computed adaptive thresholds. Algorithm 2 best describes this statement.
3.2.4 Anomaly Detection
The final step of our anomaly detection system consists of using all the pre-computed time-series for detect-
ing anomalies on each feature. For that purpose we employ Fuzzy-Logic [36, 59] or fuzzy inference system
for computing anomaly scores for each feature. In the fuzzification step, we compute anomaly scores rang-
ing between 0 and 1 on the pre-computed time-series (observed, thresholds, and predicted behaviors) using
the Gaussian Membership Function as defined in equation 3.7. If the prediction step was not triggered, we
compute these scores using the equation 3.8. After the fuzzification process is terminated, we move on to
the defuzzification process, where we define adaptive thresholds on these anomaly scores using the same
technique presented for adaptive thresholding step (EWMA), and then flag each feature as anomalous (flag
it as 1 if the anomaly score is above the threshold) or not (flag it as 0 if the anomaly score is below the
threshold). The Gaussian membership function is defined as follows [36, 59]:





where k ranges form 0 to 8 and represents the corresponding feature, xk represents the observed or expected
behavior, yk represents the predicted feature behavior in the case our predictive step is triggered, and k
represents the computed adaptive threshold for that feature. However, if the prediction step is not triggered,
the Gaussian membership function is defined as follows:
scorek = e
−(xk−k)2 (3.8)
Algorithm 3 describes how anomalies are detected on each feature. At the end of this process, we end up
with each connection extended with eight anomaly scores and flags (one for each feature), as depicted in
Table 3.2, where each connection is considered as anomalous if at least one of these eight flags is set to 1.
Algorithm 2 Proposed Predictive Algorithm
1: InputVector ← ObservedSeries
2: for each FeatureTS ∈ InputVector do
3: InputData ← Feature − Time − Series
4: Stop ← False
5: ResultingTimeSeries ← InputData
6: iCounter ← 0
7: while Stop = False and iCounter ≤ 20 do
8: p_value← ADFULLER(InputData)
9: if p_value > 0.5 then
10: InputData ← PSO(InputData)
11: else
12: ResultingTimeSeries ← InputData






Algorithm 3 Anomaly Detection Fuzzy Inference Algorithm
1: InputVector ← ObservedSeries
2: for each FeatureTS ∈ InputVector do
3: for each Obse,Threshl ,Pred ∈ FeatureTS do
4: S ← GUASSIANFUN(Obs, Threshl, Pred)
5: TH ← ANOMALY-THRESHL(S)
6: for each score, threshold ∈ S ,TH do
7: if score ≥ threshold then
8: anomalyflag ← 1
9: else






Table 3.2: Anomaly scores and flags
Anomaly Features
Scores
(between 0 and 1)
id_orig_h_anomaly_score, id_resp_h_anomaly_score, id_orig_p_anomaly_score, id_resp_p_anomaly_score,
orig_bytes_anomaly_score, resp_bytes_anomaly_score, orig_pkts_anomaly_score, resp_pkts_anomaly_score
Flags
(either 0 or 1)
id_orig_h_anomaly_flag, id_resp_h_anomaly_flag, id_orig_p_anomaly_flag ,id_resp_p_anomaly_flag,
orig_bytes_anomaly_flag, resp_bytes_anomaly_flag, orig_pkts_anomaly_flag, resp_pkts_anomaly_flag
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Chapter 4
Design, Implementation and Evaluation
In this chapter, we first describe the implementation of Daedalus, which is designed to extract cyber
threat intelligence out from BRO NIDS stream of logs. Then, we evaluate our proposed algorithm and give
insights of the proposed dashboards.
4.1 Design and Implementation
In this section, we present the implementation details of Daedalus. Figure 4.1 shows a technical overview
of the proposed tool. Daedalus is built upon the following open source tools:
a) Apache Spark: in order to improve the computation.
b) MongoDB: to store only the results of our analytics.
c) Elasticsearch: also for the storage and fast consultation, searching, and indexing of the data.
d) Grafana: which is built upon Elasticsearch in order to create the needed visualisations and dashboards.
e) Docker: each of the previously cited tools (MongoDB, Elasticsearch, and Grafana) are deployed using
dedicated docker containers.
f) Maxmind: used in order to geolocate public IP addresses.
61
Each of the open source tools mentioned above was chosen after a deep analysis of their importance
to our work:
a) Apache Spark is a highly scalable computation engine that allows its users to distribute huge compu-
tation accross multiple computation nodes within a Spark Cluster. In this work, we only deploy it on
a standalone server (processing server) but it can be deployed in the future as a cluster. We use Spark
mainly to parse a stream of BRO NIDS connection logs (both csv and json formats); Apache Spark
offers a streaming API, which enables us to achieve this task within very short delays.
b) MongoDB is used as a storage database in order to store our analytics’ results only. We do not
store raw logs as we receive them due to the fact that MongoDB is not scalable enough to save these
tremendous logs. We also chose MongoDB because it is a JSON-based storage database, which makes
it easy to query and comprehend. The raw connections are on the other hand stored as compressed
files on our storage server.
c) Elasticsearch is used for mainly two reasons. The first one is to enable fast search and aggregation
queries over the results of our analytics. The second reason is because it is necessary for creating
visualisations for our front-end platform.
d) Grafana depends on Elasticsearch (as mentioned above) and allows us to create fancy visualisations
(barcharts, piecharts, time-series visualisations, data tables, geo-maps, etc...) on top of our indexed
data in Elasticsearch. In addition to that, it allows us to achieve many security objectives; it has a set
of security functionalities that enable us to create security credentials and access restrictions for each
of our security partners.
e) Docker containers are used to deploy each of the tools mentioned above on an isolated environment
for two reasons. First, some of these services are already deployed on the dedicated processing server
(like Elasticsearch for other projects); this can lead to a failure during the installation of our tool due
to conflict with the dedicated ports, also if we deploy our data on the same existing Elastic node it
will disclose data to our security partners. The second reason is related to security measures. Docker
containers are completely isolated from the server’s OS and even if it is damaged in some way, it does
not affect the OS.
62
f) Maxmind Geolocation database is used to geolocate public (routable) IP addresses from the resulting
BRO connections (both originator and responder IP addresses). We have bought a one year license
from Maxmind that gives us monthly updates on both City and ISP databases. With both of these
databases, we get in exchange all the information needed about each IP address fed to the database;
mainly: Internet Service Provider (ISP), Organisation (Org), Autonomous System Number (ASN),
Country (country name and code), City, lattitude, and longitude.
All the BRO NIDS connection logs received from our partners are first stored on our dedicated stor-
age server, then, each week’s data is transferred securely (using ssh) to our processing/computation server
in order to analyze it. Once the analysis is done, the raw documents are deleted from the computation
server in order to minimize the disk usage on the latter one. Our proposed tool is developed using Python
programming language. First, we parse the connections received each week using Apache Spark streaming
API deployed on top of Python programming language. From this step we get the needed set of features
for our anomaly detection technique to work properly, all of the four steps of our technique are also imple-
mented using Python Pandas API alongside Apache Spark computation tool; this will allow us to execute
our proposed approach in a timely manner. In addition to its streaming API, Apache Spark also offers us
the capability of integrating both MongoDB and Elasticsearch on top of it; this will enable us in addition to
faster computation to store and access our analytics results fast and quickly on both these databases. Finally,
for the geolocation part, we use a Python-based API (geoip2). The overall framework combining those
components together is presented in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Daedalus Technical Overview
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4.2 Evaluation
This section gives more details about our experimental dataset and the evaluation metrics used to validate
our proposed technique.
4.2.1 Experimental Setup
All of our experiments are conducted on a dedicated processing server running CentOS Linux version 7
with Intel Xeon E5-2630 2.30GHz CPU and 126GB of RAM. Our framework is developed using Python
programming language and by leveraging Elasticsearch as an indexing and search database for data analyt-
ics. Apache Spark alongside with pandas Python library are used to improve the scalability and to exploit
the full capacity of our server (CPU and RAM resources). Grafana is used as a visualization tool on top
of Elasticsearch in order to create the required dashboards. Grafana security functionalities are employed
to provide additional functionalities of user management, user authentication, and indices access roles. All
the data are stored in a storage server of 500TB capacity.
Experimental Dataset. In order to perform the experiments, a number of organizations participated to col-
lect and share their IDS logs. Almost 90% of the participants installed BRO IDS, with some exceptions
that employed other types of IDS. Moreover, the locations of the sensors were different. Some organizations
choose to install their BRO sensors outside their firewalls, and therefore collect all the connections incoming
and outgoing to/from their network. This results into sharing more consistent sizes of logs per day (some-
times hundreds of millions of connections each day). Whilst others capture only the traffic outgoing from
their network, and thus less connection logs are received. In total, we receive millions of connection logs
from the participants on a daily basis, which are stored on the dedicated storage server as compressed files.
Evaluation Metrics. In order to evaluate the performance and validate our approach, Accuracy
( TP+TNTP+FP+TN+FN ), and F1 score (
2∗TP
2∗TP+FP+FN ) metrics are computed.
4.2.2 Ground Truth Correlation
In this section, we validate the results of our anomaly detection technique by correlating them with some
existing resources. We test our technique on a set of connection logs and identify the anomalies. Then, all
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the detected anomalous connections are correlated with external security feeds, such as malware sandboxing
reports. The IP blocks are extracted from each connection (originator and responder IPs) and are correlated
with the extracted malicious IPs from existing security sources within the same time interval that the connec-
tion occurred. We consider only three days of lag. Therefore, we first perform malware correlation within
the same day that the connection occurred. If there is no match, we continue the correlation with the data
of previous day. This process is repeated until the last three days. The reason of considering the three days
of lag is due to the fact that most of the malware tend to change their IP addresses in order to evade detec-
tion. We further perform the correlation with an open-source ransomware database, Ransomware Tracker
[9], which will be updated in the case of the detection of a new worldwide ransomware. Therefore, we
download the Ransomware Tracker database, and on a weekly basis we check for any changes to keep our
database updated.
From the correlation results, we consider the number of connections that were detected both by our
system as anomalies and by the correlation as malicious as true positives (TP), the ones that we flagged as
anomalous but did not return correlation results as false positives (FP), the benign connection that were not
flagged as anomalies as true negatives (TN), and the malicious connection that were not flagged as anoma-
lous as false negatives (FN). As an example, we examine 2, 438, 294 connections detected as anomalous
(from approximately 400 million connections) from one of the randomly chosen participating organization
collected from August 20, 2018 to 4th of September 2018. We correlate our results with both malware and
ransomware databases and then measure the aforementioned security metrics. The obtained results show
that we achieve 83.68% of accuracy and 91.11% of f1_score.
4.2.3 Validation on Benchmark Dataset
We further examine our proposed technique with benchmark datasets. We choose UNBCIC 2017 IDS
Dataset [73, 7], which contains the BRO connection logs as well as two csv files that label the connections as
Benign, DDoS or PortScan. We run our proposed technique on 350, 137 randomly selected connection logs
in order to detect anomalies, among which 256, 540 were detected as true positives (flagged as anomalous
and labeled either as DDoS attacks or Port Scan attacks), 16, 775 connections were detected as false posi-
tives (flagged as anomalous but there were no correlation results with DDoS and Port Scanning datasets),
66
64, 575 were detected as true negatives (neither detected as anomalous nor DDoS nor Port Scanning), and
12, 247 were detected as false negatives (were not flagged as anomalous but there were correlation matches
with DDoS and Port Scanning). The obtained results show that we achieve 91.71% of accuracy and 94.64%
of f1_score.
4.2.4 Comparison with other Anomaly Detection Approaches
In this section, we compare our proposed technique with an exiting anomaly detection approach. To this end,
we choose the K-Means clustering method [4] written in Python to detect anomalies on time series data. In
this approach, the anomalies are detected based on the reconstruction error curve. We modify the provided
implementation in order to fit it with the format of our datasets by using only four features (originator bytes
and packets, and responder bytes and packets), and we also reduce the default number of clusters to 3. The
implementation is applied on the same dataset of UNBCIC 2017 IDS, and then the results are correlated
with the labelled dataset (DDoS and PortScan attacks).The obtained results show that we achieve 44.38% of
accuracy and 56.28% of f1_score.
4.2.4.1 Long-Short Term Memory Network
In this section, we compare our proposed technique with LSTM based anomaly detection technique. To
this end, we chose keras-anomaly-detection implementation proposed in [24] using Python programming
language. The Github repository of the author contains several implementations in which one of them com-
bines LSTMs and Autoencoders (recurrent.py) in order to detect time windows in time-series that contain
anomalous patterns. We have changed the implementation in order to fit with the labeled connections of
UNBCIC 2017 IDS and also reduced the number of batches to 4 due to scalability issues (the model training
phase takes too much time). Finally, we compute the same evaluation metrics on the resulting classifications
and we acheived 55.01% of accuracy and 67.99% of f1_score.
4.2.5 Scalability Study
We compare the execution time and resources consumption of our last two evaluations (subsections 4.2.3
and ?? using 350, 137 connections from UNBCIC 2017 IDS) with the K-Means algorithm and report the
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results as illustrated in Table 4.1. The htop Linux command [2] is used to monitor the percentage of each
CPU core usage.
Table 4.1: Scalability Comparison
Our Approach K-Means
Execution Time 19(m) and 25(s) 1 hours and 16(m)
CPU Cores Used 24 Cores Dedicated;
less than 50% usage
for each core
24 Cores Dedicated; 3 cores






This section gives a detailed description of the front-end platform that we have created for our security
partners.
4.3.1 Dashboard Organisation
All the dashboards that we give access to our security partners are designed and organized the same way.
Since each connection has two IP addresses (originator and responder IPs), we have decided to split the
dashboards into mainly two columns: one for originator IPs information and another one with responder IPs
information, in addition to some statistical curves. First, we display a time-series curve, which shows the
unique count of these two IPs over the time of our analysis. This can give us an overview of the network
traffic state over time and shows us the average number of destination IPs (responder IPs) to which originator
IPs (source IPs) are connecting to as shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Time Series Overview
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In addition to these time-series, we also show the same information aggregated in a single numerical
value for both ends (originator and responder IPs), as shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Originator and Responder IPs Unique Count
After that, we display time series showing the statistical overview of attacks detected; from malware
correlation phase 4.4, from ransomware correlation phase 4.5, and anomalies detected by our technique 4.6
Figure 4.4: Malware Correlation Time Series
Figure 4.5: Ransomware Correlation Time Series
69
Figure 4.6: Anomalies Time Series
Then, we display geo-maps for both geolocated public originator and responder IPs, as shown in
Figure 4.7
Figure 4.7: Originator and Responder IPs Geo-Maps
Then, we display two pie charts that show the top 10 countries in which these potentially malicious
IPs (both originator and responder) are located in, as shown in Figure 4.8
Figure 4.8: Top 10 Originator and Responder Countries
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Moreover, we also show information about the correlation results with the external feeds (malware
and ransomware), as shown in Figure 4.9 (both originator and responder detected malware families) and
Figure 4.10 (both originator and responder ransomware family and site type) .
Figure 4.9: Top 10 Originator and Responder Malware Families




Network anomaly detection is a hot research topic that is still evolving and attracting more researchers
due to its importance in detecting security threats and its importance in analysing logged network traffic us-
ing IDS tools. In this research work, we presented Daedalus, a highly scalable time-series and unsupervised
anomaly detection approach on massive connections data streams. Daedalus achieves our objectives by
generating the maximum amount of cyber threat intelligence in an efficient and scalable manner, correlating
this generated cyber threat intelligence with factual security sources of indicators of compromise (IoCs) in
order to extend this intelligence with more security features and details, and validate the anomaly detection
technique through extensive experimentation on real-life connections stream logs. We first presented the
state of the art of existing network anomaly detection techniques. We analyzed these already existing works
and found that the majority of them concentrate their work and validation on small real datasets or synthetic
(benchmark) datasets. Therefore, their scalabilty results are not convenient and relevant for our case where
we receive massive amounts of connections stream logs. Thus, we proposed a scalable time-series analysis
technique that detects anomalies on these received logs in reasonable time and without consuming much
resources (CPU and RAM). Consequently, the tool was developed using Python programming language
alongside with some well-known state of the art tools and frameworks like Apache Spark for fast computa-
tions, Elasticsearch, mongoDB for storage purposes, Grafana for visualisation functionalities and to enable
secure access to our front-end. Finally, we evaluated the accuracy and performance of our proposed tech-
nique during a three step process; ground truth correlation where we correlate the results of our algorithm
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with factual and reliable security feeds (malware and ransomware), validation on benchmark dataset where
we apply our methodology on a synthetic well-known dataset (from UNBCIC), and comparison with other
anomaly detection techniques where we compare the accuracy and performance results of our technique
during the second step (on UNBCIC benchmark dataset) with other already existing implementations (K-
Means and LSTMs). Subsequently, we have found that not only our algorithm achieves the highest accuracy
results, but it also outperforms the other techniques in terms of execution times, CPU cores usage, and
RAM usage. After achieving the aforementioned objectives and solving the stated problem, our research
contributions consist of the following:
a) Comparative study of the existing state of the art network anomaly detection techniques.
b) Design and elaboration of a novel efficient and scalable network anomaly detection technique on
massive connections data steams.
c) Design and implementation of a framework that analyzes massive connections data streams.
Daedalus can be improved in the future from different aspects. First, there is the issue of high rates
of false positives on the real datasets (stream of BRO NIDS connection logs) which is normal due to the
fact that BRO NIDS is characterized by its high false positives rate, but can be reduced by tunning our
proposed algorithm (one possible solution is to change the parameters for the adaptive threshold). Second,
the geolocation process is done on each IP address separately which consumes a lot of resources (time and
CPU), one way to fix this is to summarize these IPs by ranges and process them.
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